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Introduction 
Host Government Instruments (“HGIs”) aim to regulate and manage 
exploration and production activities (“E&P” or “Upstream”), between the 
resource owner (typically the State) and oil and gas company or a 
consortium of oil and gas companies (typically International Oil Companies 
(“IOCs”)).
1
 Although there are different types of HGIs, it is necessary for 
                                                                                                             
 1. For further information about HGIs see: Anthony Jennings, Oil and Gas 
Exploration Contracts (2nd edn Sweet & Maxwell, London 2008), Anthony Jennings (ed), 
Oil and Gas Production Contracts (Sweet & Maxwell, London 2008), Bernard G. Taverne, 
An Introduction to the Regulation of the Petroleum Industry: Law, Contracts and 
Conventions (Graham & Trotman, London 1994), Bernard. G. Taverne, Co-Operative 
Agreements in the Extractive Petroleum Industry (Kluwer Law International, Hague 1996), 
Bernard. G. Taverne, Petroleum, Industry and Governments: A study of the Involvement of 
Industry and Governments in the Production and Use of Petroleum (2nd  edn Kluwer Law 
International, Alphen aan den Rijn 2008), Eduardo G. Pereira (ed.), The Encyclopaedia of 
Oil and Gas Law, Volume One: Upstream (2nd edn Globe Law and Business 2020), 
Eduardo G. Pereira, Kim Talus (eds.), Upstream Law and Regulation: A Global Guide 
Volume 1 – Africa and the Americas (2nd edn Globe Law and Business 2017), Eduardo G. 
Pereira, Kim Talus (eds.), Upstream Law and Regulation: A Global Guide Volume 2 – 
Europe, Middle East, Asia and Australia (2nd edn. Globe Law and Business 2017),Chris 
Thorpe, Fundamentals of Upstream Petroleum Agreements (CP Thorpe, UK 2008), Claude 
Duval and others, International Petroleum and Exploration Agreements: Legal, Economic & 
Policy Aspects (2nd edn Barrows, New York 2009), Daniel Jonhston, International 
Exploration Economics, Risk, and Contract Analysis (PenWell, Tulsa 2003), Daniel 
Johnston, International Petroleum Fiscal Systems and production sharing contracts 
(Penwell, Oklahoma 1994), Ernest E. Smith and others, International Petroleum 
Transactions (3rd edn RMMLF, Westminster 2010), Greg Gordon, John Paterson (eds), Oil 
and Gas Law: Current Practice and Emerging Trends (DUP, Dundee 2007), Henry Cattan, 
The Evolution of Oil Concessions in the Middle East and North Africa (Oceana, New York 
1967), Kirsten Bindemann, Production Sharing Agreements: An Economic Analysis (Oxford 
Institute for Energy Studies, Oxford 1999), Khong Cho Oon, The Politics of Oil in 
Indonesia: Foreign Company-Host Governments Relations (CUP, Cambridge 2009), Martyn 
R. David, Upstream Oil and Gas Agreements (Sweet and Maxwell, London 1996), 
Muhammed Mazeel, Petroleum Fiscal Systems and Contracts (Diplomica Verlag, 2010 
Hamburg), P.H. Frankel, Essentials of Petroleum: A key to Oil Economics (2nd Frank Cass, 
London 1976), Raymond F. Mikesell, Petroleum Company Operations & Agreements in the 
Developing Countries (Resources for the Future, Washington 1984), Tengku Nathan 
Machand, The Indonesian Production Sharing Contract: An Investor Perspective (Kluwer 
Law International, Hague 2000), Terence Daintith, Geoffrey Willoughby (eds), Adrian Hill, 
United Kingdom Oil & Gas Law (3rd edn Sweet & Maxwell, London 2009), Thomas E. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol6/iss1/3
2020] Host-Granting Instrument Models: Why Do They Matter 27 
 
 
the terms and conditions of each HGI to manage the expectations of 
investors and guarantee suitable protection for any investments, while 
achieving the main objectives of the relevant host nation which might vary 
from country-to-country (e.g. energy security, economic development, local 
employment, etc).
2
 
Despite many global variations of HGIs, there are – broadly speaking – 
two main approaches that Host Governments (“HG”) can adopt to allow 
third parties to explore and/or exploit their petroleum resources. These are a 
legislation-based approach (via license-granting) and a contract-based 
approach.
3
 Nevertheless, both approaches combine contractual arrangement 
and regulations.
4
   
This paper focuses on the HGIs falling into the contract-based category, 
defined as, 
[a]rrangements between foreign investors and host countries for 
the development of natural resources have carried many names: 
                                                                                                             
Ward, Negotiations for Oil Concessions in Bahrain, El Hasa (Saudi Arabia), The Neutral 
Zone, Qatar and Kuwait (Ardles, New York 1965), Thomas W. Walde (ed.) & George K. 
Ndi (ed.), International Oil and Gas Investments, Moving Eastward? (Graham & 
Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff, London 1994), A. Konoplianik, ´PSA Debate: Getting rid of 
rival`[2003] OGEL, A. Konoplianik, ´The fight against PSA in Russia, Who is to Benefit 
and why not the State?`(2003) 3 OGEL 1, Aida Avanessian ´Buy-back - the main mode of 
contracting in petroleum projects in Iran` (2009) 5 I.E.L.R. 167-170, Ian Rutledge, ‘The 
Sakhalin II PSA – a Production ‘Non-Sharing’ Agreement, Analysis of Revenue 
Distribution’ (2004) SERIS, Jacinta Jackson, Peter Roberts, ´The Iranian buyback 
concession: the principle and the prospects` (2001) 7 I.E.L.T.R. 159-161,Paul Stevens, 
‘National Oil Companies and International Oil Companies in the Middle East: Under the 
Shadow of Government and the Resource Nationalism Cycle’ (2008) 1 Journal of World 
Energy Law & Business 5;  
 2. Kim Talus, Scott Looper and Steven Otillar, ‘Lex Petrolea and the 
Internationalization of Petroleum Agreements: Focus on Host Government Contracts’ (2012) 
5 The Journal of World Energy Law & Business 181. 
 3. It is worth noting that, broadly speaking, “license based petroleum legislation has 
been, in recent times, almost exclusively adopted in western countries, i.e. in countries with 
a developed economy and an advanced, sophisticated legal system, all of which happen to be 
member states of the Organisation for Economic and Development (OECD). In non-western 
countries, i.e. countries with a developing or emerging economy, the present day petroleum 
legislation is based on and centered around state participation in combination with a contract 
of work, the latter almost exclusively in the form of the production sharing contract” 
Taverne, B. 2013, Petroleum, Industry and Governments. Wolters Kluwer. p.157. 
 4.  Omowumi O Iledare, ‘Analyzing the Impact of Petroleum Fiscal Arrangements and 
Contract Terms on Petroleum E&P Economics and the Host Government Take’, Nigeria 
Annual International Conference and Exhibition (Society of Petroleum Engineers 2004). 
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“concession agreement,” “economic development agreement,” 
“service contract,” “work contract,” “joint venture contract,” 
“production-sharing agreement,” and, most recently, 
“participation agreement.” Occasionally, within particular 
countries, the distinctions in terminology are significant in 
differentiating various forms of arrangements. In other instances, 
varying terminologies relate to agreements of essentially the 
same nature. In other cases, the same terminology has been 
utilised in one country for agreements which are, in substance, 
quite different from each other.
5
 
In general, the contractual approach of HGIs is grouped into three main 
categories: firstly, concession agreements, secondly, production-sharing 
contracts (“PSCs”) and thirdly, service contracts.
6
 Although these three 
categories are the most common forms available in the oil and gas industry 
they might not exist in their pure form as some features of each form could 
be combined in a hybrid model or two or more HGIs could exist in the 
same host country in different or same areas. In addition, although they will 
not be covered by this paper, one should note that in certain specific and 
less common cases a fifth and sixth options could exist via joint venture 
agreement and as reconnaissance/study agreement. The former is a fairly 
unusual model for an HGI but it is far more commonly used between oil 
and gas companies to share their costs and risks in a given HGI.
7
  The 
former (joint venture agreement) is rarely adopted in the modern days (i.e. 
Qatar). This is why it will only be briefly mentioned in our Appendix for 
“historical” reasons. The latter will not be covered in this paper nor 
Appendix as they deal with preliminary form of agreements which could 
lead to a HGI.   
In any case, HGs and IOCs might prefer a particular type of HGI. There 
is a perception that the HG or the IOCs might be more protected with one 
type as opposed to another.
8
 Quite often HGs modify their legal system to 
                                                                                                             
 5. David N Smith and Louis T Wells, ‘Mineral Agreements in Developing Countries: 
Structures and Substance’ (1975) 69 American Journal of International Law 560.  
 6.  See note 1. Kirsten Bindemann, Production-Sharing Agreements: An Economic 
Analysis (OIES 1999) 9. 
 7.  Ibid. 
 8. .For more information see Eduardo G. Pereira, Damilola S. Olawuyi (eds.), 
Practical Considerations to Negotiate an Enforceable Joint Operating Agreement Under 
Civil Law Jurisdictions (Kluwer International Law 2020), Eduardo G. Pereira, Joint 
Operating Agreements: Risk Control for the Non-Operator (Globe Law and Business 2nd 
edn. 2018), Eduardo G. Pereira, Wan M. Z. Wan Zahari (eds), Joint Operating Agreement 
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incorporate a new type of HGI or implement new features to an existing 
HGI. 
This paper aims to explore the following questions: (1) what are the key 
differences between contract based HGIs? (2) Does it matter what type of 
HGI the HGs offer and if so, is there a better one? (3) Why HGIs keep 
changing and can stabilization truly be achived?  
In order to answer the research questions, the article is structured as 
follows. Section 1 briefly defines the three types of contractual HGIs. 
Sections 2 through 4 describe in greater detail the similarities and 
differences between HGIs in regard to ownership of resources, HGs’ 
intervention and control and fiscal term. Section 5 reviews the pursuit of 
stabilization of HGIs. Section 6 provides a discussion and answers the 
research questions, followed by the paper’s conclusions.    
The paper draws on the most common forms of HGI and the experience 
of a variety of jurisdictions (including but not limited to the United 
Kingdom, Norway, Denmark, Brazil, Malaysia, Indonesia, Iran, Kuwait and 
Saudi Arabia, among others). Nevertheless, the paper does not purport to be 
specific to any specific jurisdiction, thus examples are solely used to 
illustrate the various points and general principles.  
1. Defining Host Governmental Instruments 
Before the article engages in the discussion of the advantages and 
disadvantages arising from the type of HGI chosen, it is useful to first 
define and identify the characteristics of each instrument. However, it is not 
the main goal of this paper to overview such preliminary information in 
detail even though it might be useful information. For this reason, further 
details and examples about these HGIs can be found on appendix A of this 
paper as well as on relevant footnotes.
9
 
As previously mentioned, HGIs could be divided between two types of 
systems. Regulatory and contractual based systems. Regulatory-based 
systems are the HGIs developed via regulations and are typically less 
flexible for negotiation. Two examples are licenses and public leases. 
Contractual based systems are the HGIs developed via contracts and they 
tend to allow more flexibility for negotiations. Some examples include the 
concession agreement, production sharing agreement, and service contracts. 
Nevertheless, some HGIs might exhibit a duality between contractual and 
                                                                                                             
(JOA): Applicability and Enforceability of Default Provisions (RMMLF 2018). Eduardo G. 
Pereira (ed.), Understanding Joint Operating Agreements (Intersentia 2016).  
 9.  Smith and others (n 1). 
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regulatory nature, such as in the UK or the joint venture agreement used in 
Qatar.
10
 
In a nutshell, the main characteristics between the most common 
contractual-based HGI are: 
 
Elements Concession Production 
Sharing 
Contracts (PSC) 
Services Contracts 
Pure Service Risk Service 
Risk  The investor 
takes all 
financial and 
technical risks. 
 The investor 
takes all 
financial and 
technical risks. 
All financial and 
technical risks 
are taken by HG. 
The investor takes all 
financial and technical 
risks. 
Resources The HG tends 
to own all the 
reserves in the 
country.  
However, 
investor tends 
to own all 
production and 
pay “taxes”.  
 
The HG owns all 
the reserves in 
the country. 
However, 
investor tends 
to receive a 
share of the 
production and 
is reimbursed 
some costs but 
might pay 
“taxes”. 
The HG owns all 
the reserves and 
production in 
the country. 
Investor might 
be paid in fee 
and/or in kind 
and is 
reimbursed 
some costs but 
might be subject 
to “tax”.   
 
 
The HG owns all the 
reserves and 
production in the 
country. Investor might 
be paid in fee and/or in 
kind and reimbursed 
some costs but might 
be subject to tax. 
Nevertheless, the 
investor should have a 
“premium” or higher 
fee in comparison to a 
pure service contract 
due to the additional 
risks.  
2. Ownership of Resources 
Notwithstanding the HGI model used, the HG will usually have 
ownership of the oil and gas resources before their extraction (with the 
                                                                                                             
 10. In some jurisdictions a joint venture with a government entity is required to develop 
resources. This is not a common approach adopted by host governments but rather between 
oil and gas companies in order to share the risks and costs agreed in a relevant HGI. 
However, there are some exceptions like Qatar still persist but it was adopted more widely in 
the past decades in the MENA region. Qatar has been trending away from production 
sharing agreements to joint ventures. The North Oil Company is a joint venture with the 
NOC, Qatar Petroleum, and Total developing and producing on of the largest and most 
complex oil fields in the world, the Al-Shaheen Field.  Mahmmod S., Oil and Gas 
Regulation in Qatar: Overview, Thompson Reuters: Practical Law.  
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exception of those countries where the ownership of the mineral resources 
lies with the owner of the land or in the case of historical concessions).
11
 
The critical point for the HGIs is the precise moment of the transfer of 
ownership of the resources to the IOCs.  
Generally, in the concession model, the property in oil and gas is 
transferred immediately to the IOC upon production (e.g., at the wellhead) 
or in another moment defined by the parties. Under the concessionary 
system, the oil and gas companies are usually given right over a particular 
area, including access to potential reserves contained in the field and any 
related production.
12
 In exchange for these rights, the concessionaire is 
obliged to pay the government the royalties and/or taxes.
13
 
Under the PSC, the production is owned by the HG, and the IOC’s share 
is transferred to it at a point determined by the parties (e.g., an export or 
measurement point).
14
  However, the precise share allocation depends on 
the agreed terms of the relevant PSC.  
For Service Contracts, there is no mandatory transfer of ownership of 
the produced resources. The compensation of the IOC may be part of the 
production, and in such a case this would be at a designated point for 
transfer. Alternatively, the IOC may be entitled to purchase the oil at a 
discounted price (here, there would also be a specific point determined for 
the transfer, or a specific fee and reimbursed costs might be paid by the 
IOC for a certain amount of production).
15
 This would depend on how the 
compensation for the IOC is set under each service contract.  
PSCs and Service Contracts are similar, but not identical; the main 
distinction is that Service Contracts reimburse IOCs in cash rather than in 
kind.
16
 Moreover, Service Contracts provide compensation for the 
contractor either on a fixed-fee basis at defined periods (with possibilities 
                                                                                                             
 11. N. BRET-ROUZAUT & J.P. FAVENNEC, OIL AND GAS EXPLORATION AND PRODUCTION: 
RESERVES, COSTS, CONTRACTS   (Editions Technip, 2011), p 171. Also Estudos de 
Alternativas Regulatórias, Institucionais e Financeiras para a Exploração e Produção de 
Petróleo e Gás Natural e para o Desenvolvimento Industrial da Cadeia Produtiva de 
Petróleo e Gás Natural no Brasil, available at 
www.bndes.gov.br/SiteBNDES/export/sites/default/bndes_pt/.../ 
RelConsol-2de6.pdf (accessed on October 2019). 
 12. Ibid. 
 13. BRET-ROUZAUT & FAVENNEC, 2011, p 174. 
 14. Id. at 174-175. 
 15. Abbas Ghandi and CY Cynthia Lin, ‘Oil and Gas Service Contracts around the 
World: A Review’ [2014] Energy Strategy Reviews. 
 16. Rex J Zedalis, Claims Against Iraqi Oil and Gas: Legal Considerations and Lessons 
Learned (Cambridge University Press 2010) 189. 
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of incremental fees), or upon completion plus some cost recovery in certain 
instances.
17
 
Regardless of the ownership of the resources, under normal 
circumstances in the PSC and concession systems, the IOCs may book the 
reserves in their accounting system. This is relevant for IOCs as it 
represents one of the financial indicators that investors and shareholders 
examine to verify the economic status of the company.
18
 The IOCs cannot 
normally book reserves under a Service Contract because mere contractors 
as a service provider have no ownership over reserves or production. 
However, an exception might be made for RSC where the IOCs take certain 
risks and therefore might have some ownership rights.  
Regarding the ownership of goods, equipment and data, there are four 
types of ownership: (i) host government property; (ii) property of the IOCs, 
but transferred to host government upon termination of HGIs; (iii) shared 
property between IOC and Host Government; and (iv) property of the 
IOCs.
19
 
While ownership issues may not be directly linked to the HGI model, the 
type implemented creates different operating environments that lead to 
ownership questions. For example, under concession models the IOCs 
would usually take ownership of goods, equipment and data.
20
 However, 
the ownership of the data (e.g. seismic data) acquired might be more 
restricted as it is more likely to be the property of the host government.
 21
 It 
is important to note however, that IOCs often keep their intellectual 
property under any HGI.
22
 
                                                                                                             
 17. See fn. 67 above, p. 
 18. .Oil companies must tell investors how much oil they have access to, because this is 
a key indicator of their ability to maintain production and therefore revenues. Companies 
generally prefer Concession systems because this system allows the company to list all 
reserves in its books. In a PSC, it can list only the barrels it keeps. Thus if a company agrees 
to give the Government 70 percent of the oil from a field, it can book only the remaining 30 
percent. 
 19. .Estudos de Alternativas Regulatórias, Institucionais e Financeiras para a 
Exploração e Produção de Petróleo e Gás Natural e para o Desenvolvimento Industrial da 
Cadeia Produtiva de Petróleo e Gás Natural no Brasil, available at 
www.bndes.gov.br/SiteBNDES/export/sites/default/bndes_pt/.../ 
RelConsol-2de6.pdf (accessed on 10th October 2019). 
 20.  Ghandi and Lin (n 15). 
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In contrast, in PSCs, the property of the equipment and infrastructure 
installed by the IOCs are usually transferred to the host government (except 
for leased goods in some jurisdictions).
23
 A debate often occurs on PSCs or 
RSC about the precise timing of this transfer of ownership. Should this 
transfer take place at the time of the cost recovery, or should it occur at the 
end of the contract? Usually, it is going to be the formerunless the contract 
terminates earlier since the IOC is less likely to retain ownership acquired 
in relation to the project in a PSC system. This system does not encourage 
IOCs to acquire goods or property until they know that there is enough 
production to offset these costs.  
Finally, in service contracts, the HG or its NOC is usually the operator 
of the field, and the IOCs are similar to service providers. Therefore, the 
host government owns the goods, equipment and data related to such 
contracts.  
3. Host Government Intervention and Control 
When deciding its E&P legal framework, a HG takes into accounts both 
economic and tax benefits, but also social and political pressures. The latter 
play a significant role in this decision, especially in developing countries.
24
 
The following sub-headings are going to explore different layers of HG 
intervention and control over oil and gas resources.  
3.1. Intervention and Control from a HG Perspective 
One of the critical issues is the level of intervention and control desired 
by the HG.
25
 For example, under the concession system, the State provides 
an instrument to make a legal arrangement with the concessionaire to 
develop oil and gas resources of the State. The instrument lays down the 
terms and conditions of the said arrangement, as well as rights and duties 
between the concessionaire and States under both public and private laws.
 26
 
The HG will grant exclusive rights to a concessionaire for hydrocarbon 
E&P in a given area over a specified period. Upon signing the agreement, 
the concessionaire has the right to conduct exploration and, if successful in 
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making a commercial discovery, to develop it.
27
 Typically the 
concessionaire also has the right to take ownership of the oil and gas 
produced and to dispose of such production without restriction.  
In short, the main characteristic of the concession system is the latitude 
of “freedom” given for the investor to explore and develop oil and gas 
resources even though more restrictions and control could be imposed in 
this type of HGI.
28
 
3.1.1. Field Development Monitorization, National Market Quotas & 
State Participation 
Although the modern concession might entail more discretion to oil and 
gas companies, it is not a “free pass” as it once was common under older 
concessions. The HGs have learned that retaining certain controls over their 
resources is in their best interest. For example, a HG often approves a field 
development plan before any production phase. Additionally, it can secure 
higher participation over the field production by either requesting the fiscal 
consideration to be paid in kind, or by establishing a domestic market 
obligation to secure supplies of oil and gas production for its nation, 
although the investor might consider national obligations negatively when 
deciding to enter a country.
29
 This scenario could be seen in the Malaysian 
regime where the oil and gas companies had been previously operating 
under a concession system during British protectorate.
30
 Post-independence, 
Malaysia inherited and continued using the same concession system. 
Nevertheless, after the 1973 oil embargo, the oil-producing countries of the 
world realised the importance of monitoring and having closer control over 
their petroleum resources.
31
 In Malaysia, it led to the legislation of the 
Petroleum Development Act (PDA) in 1974 and the formation of a NOC to 
ensure that the nation’s petroleum resources could be developed in line with 
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the desires and wishes of the nation and a new HGI was put in place as 
described on Appendix A.
32
 
The participation of a NOC could also influence whether the HG should 
choose a more interventionist model.
33
 In relation to this, the NOC’s 
majority or preferential participation could be mandated with access to 
strategic areas, pre-emption rights, and carried interest or there could be a 
more open market approach where the IOC and the NOC compete for the 
same acreage on a level playing field.
34
  
For example, in Brazil, an issue arose as to the importance of 
implementing a “new” petroleum regime to develop the Pre-Salt area.
35
 
This change arose from political motivations and the objectives to increase 
government take and control of the operations, which are directly related to 
the rationale behind the PSC system.
36
  It is possible to suggest that the 
creation of the Pré-Sal Petróleo S.A. (PPSA), as the “manager” of the local 
PSC regime, and the PSC system itself, has a clear political motivation, as 
supported by several authors,
37
 such as John Gault: 
“The primary difference between a well-designed PSC and a 
well-designed tax and royalty system is not economic but 
political: the PSC gives the appearance that the host country 
NOC remains the owner of the reserves in the ground until they 
are produced. I have always assumed that this appearance was 
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the primary reason why some host governments introduced PSCs 
in the first place.”
38
 
Although most developing countries face popular claims to protect 
national resources and feel uncomfortable delegating proprietary rights to 
an IOC, this, in theory, should not apply to the current Brazilian scenario as 
the state monopoly was relaxed in 1995 and was working reasonably well 
for over ten years.
39
 However, sustained political stability is hard to achieve 
in any country, and the changes within the Brazilian upstream sector seem 
to be a regressive measure towards national restriction of private and 
foreign investment.
40
 Nevertheless, it is important to highlight that some of 
the restrictions of the PSA regime (e.g. operatorship) have been made more 
flexible due to the financial crises and scandals suffered by Petrobras.
41
 
Further details about the evolution of the Brazilian HGI can be found on 
Appendix A.  
It is also important to bear in mind that state participation from an HG 
point of view can vary due to certain aspects such as, total state control of 
the activity under Service Contracts, shared control in a PSC between the 
NOC and the IOCs or the sole regulation and audit of activities under the 
concession agreement.
42
 For instance, while the HG is usually the most 
participative under Service Contracts, theoretically it also assumes higher 
risks under this type of agreement.
43
 Therefore, the HG is unlikely to use 
this system for exploration activities, as it would prefer to use a Risk 
Service Contract where risks are delegated to the investor.
44
 In these 
agreements, the government contracts with an IOC to conduct a specific 
technical service regarding the exploitation of petroleum resources within a 
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stipulated period, while retaining the ownership, control, risk, and reward.
45
 
In this sense, a Service Contract could have a “pure” nature (without risks) 
or a “hybrid” nature (with risks) and becoming similar to a PSC.
46
  
At the same time, it should be noted that the role of the NOC varies from 
country to country. It could possess regulatory or commercial roles and 
sometimes both.
47
 In some instances, the NOC might have more “power 
and control” than the actual government. This was the case in Mexico and 
Brazil during their “monopoly” period due to their regulatory powers, 
expertise and financial resources.
48
 In other cases, the NOC might have a 
purely commercial role, in which it could be involved from the exploration 
stage or after finding and developing a commercial discovery.
49
 Such 
involvement could be exercised via regulatory and compulsory procedures, 
or voluntarily by the decision of the relevant investors.
50
 
Even under the arrangement of PSCs, the level of intervention depends 
on the actual contractual structure, including the position of the NOC, i.e. 
whether an NOC will operate the project, or whether it is focused on 
learning from the IOCs during the exploration phase of the PSC or even if 
the NOC will join later in the development stage whenever the exploratory 
risks were mitigated.
51
 The E&P activities in a PSC are conducted in a 
manner similar to those covered by the concession system or Risk Service 
Contract with the risks and costs being borne by the investor.  
3.1.3 Control and Intervention in Concession Agreements  
Regarding controlling mechanisms, under the Concession (including 
other types of tax regime systems like lease and license), the main role of 
the HG is to enact rules and principles guiding the E&P activities of the 
IOCs. However, in some cases a NOC might participate in “partnership” 
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with such companies, like in Brazil or Norway.
52
 However, the concession 
system could be combined with firm regulatory control consisting of a 
range of checks and balances and a variety of host governmental approvals 
(e.g. Norway).
53
  
Developed countries do not seek a complete ownership of oil and gas 
resources. This is why they tend to use a concession regime or a “variation” 
of it (i.e. leases in the United States, licenses in the United Kingdom).
54
 
Developing nations tend to use a more interventionist approach to secure 
the ownership of their resources (such as the PSC models) either to better 
understand how the E&P phase actually works and to gain know-how and 
expertise, or as a result of political or nationalist feelings concerning 
ownership of discovered resources in line with the UN General Assembly 
Resolution 1803 on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources.
55
 
Exceptions generated by nationalistic feelings due occur in developed 
countries, as in the case of the Danish Sole Concession granted to Maersk. 
The choice is also impacted by historical factors. The regime used in the 
past tends to become more consolidated and firmly established within a 
country’s legal framework, thus limiting the use of diverse models, except 
in cases of “unstable” political environment which might encourage the 
creation of a new regime like the example from the PSC system in Brazil.
56
 
In turn, IOCs will mainly use the economic feasibility and returns from any 
HGI applied by the host country to decide whether it is worth investing, 
regardless of whether it is a Service Contract, Concession or PSC or 
something else.
57 
The main concern for IOCs is whether the contract 
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provides adequate returns to justify the risk and required investments.
 58
 
However, there are a number of risks that a IOC should consider prior to 
engaging in any upstream investment (i.e. geology, infrastructure, political, 
legal and tax system, etc).
59
 These risks certainly include the level of 
intervention of a given host government, and the IOCs will have to decide if 
they are willing to accept such risks or they invest in another country.
60
 
Further, the nature of the PSCs (including Concession and Risk Service 
Contracts) is that they are “risk contracts” where the investor ventures into 
oil and gas exploration related investments against the possibility of oil and 
gas availability.
61
 If oil or gas is not found in commercial terms, then IOCs 
lose their investment. Otherwise, IOCs are granted a share of oil and gas 
produced as specified in the contract in case of commercial success.
62
 Some 
could argue that PSCs (including Concession and Risk Service Contracts) 
might not be appropriate for granting rights to oil and gas reserves that 
carry “insufficient” risks.
63
 Gulf countries with high production levels, 
extensive reserves and low operating costs (from reserves mostly located 
onshore or in shallow waters) do not normally award a contract with private 
IOCs and even in conditions where they do, they do not use PSCs.
64
 For 
example, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran and the United Arab Emirates tend to 
pay IOCs an agreed compensation for oil exploration and development 
rather than a share of the oil and gas.
65 
Nevertheless, it is relevant to note 
that certain prolific oil and gas reserves are being produced from the US 
under a lease type of HGI with relatively low risk and it seems to be 
suitable for all relevant stakeholders.
66
  
In Iraq, misalignment has arisen over whether the Kurdish Regional 
Government (“KRG”) has authority to enter into international oil and gas 
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agreements, such as PSCs, which have received widespread criticism.
67
 In 
Iraq, onshore production costs only a few US dollars per barrel and it might 
be argued that there is an insufficient geological risk to justify the use of 
PSCs in a number of areas with proven reserves.
68
 Iraqi fields hold high 
production levels and a low operating cost, which is more common with 
onshore than offshore reserves as they are larger and geologically less 
complicated.
69
 Iraqi fields and reservoirs have been specified, determined 
and assessed.
70
 This is even more evident when considering the geological 
structures with no exploratory wells since the possibility of success to find 
oil or gas in these structures is among the highest in the world and has been 
given a percentage success rate of 70–80 percent.
71
 However, Iraq and other 
countries in this region pose other types of risks, ranging from political 
stability to security, which the IOCs should consider before signing any 
HGI.
 72
 
In countries with vast reserves, Service Contracts tend to be the preferred 
option.
73 
The main reason is to comply with constitutional and statutory 
restraints on foreign ownership of oil and gas.
74
 In Iraq, apart from the 
PSCs concluded by the KRG, the Ministry of Oil limits licensing auctions 
to service contracts.
75
  
In short, the relevant stakeholders usually search for a balance between 
risk and reward. IOCs analyse a large variety of risks (e.g. geological, 
technical, environmental, financial, political, security, legal) in order to 
understand what best aligns with their desired financial metrics and 
corporate profile.  
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4. Fiscal terms 
An efficient fiscal system should be designed to encourage IOCs to 
extensively explore the HG’s sedimentary basins and develop both small 
and marginal fields as well as highly profitable fields, to maximise oil and 
gas recovery and prevent premature field abandonment.
76
 In designing any 
fiscal regime, the government should endeavour to keep a balance between 
its primary objective of maximising its “share” of the project’s economic 
rent
77
 and the IOC’s need for a commercially viable investment.  An 
efficient fiscal system should not be like a zero-sum game in which there is 
a winner or loser, but a positive-sum-game or a win-win game in which 
both the HG and IOC benefit, where the level of investment and rewards 
are inextricably linked.
78
 Long-term stability and simplicity in interpretation 
are also essential requirements. 
In theory, both HGs and IOCs share the same goal in an HGI, which is to 
obtain the highest possible return from a specific project. However, while 
host governments attempt to obtain higher values as “government take” 
from the revenues obtained from upstream activities, IOCs seek the most 
advantageous regimes globally, balancing risks and opportunities. 
Thus, the fiscal terms are, undoubtedly, one of the most relevant aspects 
of HGIs. As per a International Monetary Fund’s working paper, “[t]he 
central fiscal issue is ensuring a ‘reasonable’ government share in the rents 
often arising in the EIs”.
79
 Rents are “the excess of revenues over all costs 
of production, including those of discovery and development, as well as the 
normal return to capital”.
80
 Even though a tax of 100 percent on these rents 
would not necessarily render upstream activities unprofitable, as the 
standard rate to capital would grant a certain return, there would be no 
incentives for IOCs to invest in exploration, development and production.
81
  
                                                                                                             
 76. Alexander G Kemp and Waniss A Otman, ‘The Petroleum Development Investment 
Risks and Returns in Libya: A Monte Carlo Study of the Current Contractual Terms (EPSA 
IV)’ [2004] NORTH SEA STUDY OCCASIONAL PAPERS. 
 77. Kemp defines economic rent as ‘returns accruing to a factor of production more than 
its transfer earnings. Alexander G Kemp, Petroleum Rent Collection around the World 
(IRPP 1987) 5.  
 78. .LE H Leuch, ‘Petroleum Exploration Production Agreements and Taxation’ [2001] 
IFP, France. 
 79.  Carlo Cottarelli, ‘Fiscal Regimes for Extractive Industries: Design and 
Implementation’ [2012] International Monetary Fund 67. 
 80. Cottarelli (n 79). 
 81. Tordo (n 33). 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2020
42 Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal [Vol. 5 
  
 
In this sense, the issue for HGs is finding how much economic rent they 
can derive from HGIs, while at the same time providing sufficient 
incentives for IOCs to invest.
82
 Moreover, HGs compete internationally 
against each other for the investments of IOCs,
83
 this being more 
challenging for developing countries.
84
 Thus, HGs try neither to establish a 
fiscal regime that is too burdensome on IOCs, as it would probably lead to 
IOCs investing in other countries, nor to offer too generous conditions in 
detriment of its public interest.
85
  
It is also important to consider that an effective fiscal regime must 
consider and be consistent with actual conditions of the relevant country 
(including relevant risks and resources).
86
 For example, the Indonesian 
government, through its Regulation No 8 of 2017, mandated that for all new 
PSCs, a “gross split” mechanism will determine the allocation of 
production from petroleum operations between the State and the contractor 
without a cost recovery system.
 87
  In this case, the contractors will be 
allocated a potentially higher percentage share of gross production in 
exchange for the removal of the cost recovery system.
88
 
The driver for this fundamental change was primarily the prevailing low 
oil price scenario. This meant that in 2016 the Indonesian Government’s 
share of oil and gas revenues was reduced by $13.9 billion, which it had 
paid for its oil and gas cost recovery obligations, ‘significantly more than 
the $12.86 billion in non-tax revenues’
89
 realized from the oil and gas sector 
in the country.
90
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The new gross split regime represents a significant change in the fiscal 
terms of Indonesian PSCs.
91
 The Regulation demonstrates the willingness 
of the Indonesian Government, in a low crude price scenario, to share more 
of the downside of lower oil prices in order to encourage continued 
investment in Indonesia, during challenging periods in the oil price cycle. 
Apparently,  
the absence of cost recovery in gross split PSCs will mean that 
the State’s entitlement to oil and gas in the early years of 
production under a gross split PSC will be higher. As a result, 
contractors may need to wait longer to recover their investment 
costs under gross split PSCs. This changes the dynamics of a 
contractor’s investment and potentially increases their 
investment and funding risk. Contractors will likely place 
increased emphasis on reserves and production forecasts when 
making their investment decisions and may seek to mitigate their 
cost exposure where there is more uncertainty in terms of 
investment recovery (e.g. when agreeing on firm work 
commitments).
92
 
It will be interesting to see if similar changes to the traditional PSC take 
place in other jurisdictions as Indonesia was a pioneer HG to adopt and 
promote PSC standards for the past decades. These proposed changes could 
eliminate the inefficiency or potential corruption in the PSC system because 
the cost recovery tends to be a contentious topic for both the Investor and 
HGs.
93
 The investor is not keen to conduct any activity that is not going to 
be allowed under the cost recovery system. The HG is keen to reject 
anything that is not strictly under the cost recovery system or eventually 
removing the wrongful incentives to keep costs high and reduce the said 
profit split.
94
 Nevertheless, it might be challenging to implement such 
changes on existing contracts as it would require complicated re-
negotiations, or it might end up in potential disputes concerning the stability 
of the agreements in place. 
The choice of fiscal regimes may be divided into two legislation-based 
approaches via license-granting or the concession system (both commonly 
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referred to as a “tax and royalties” system) and those systems that are based 
on PSCs and service contracts.
95
 In the tax and royalties system, the 
compensation received by the host government relies mostly on royalties 
and/or income taxes on the IOC profits.
 96
 This is, theoretically, a simpler 
system than the contractual system based on PSCs and service contracts, 
even though a number of HGIs adopt both systems.
97
 Nevertheless, some 
countries abolished royalties from their fiscal system due to their regressive 
nature (e.g. the UK and Norway) and focused on a fiscal system based on 
profit.
98
 
The compensation system based on PSCs and service contracts will 
depend on whether the chosen HGI is a PSC or a service contract. In the 
PSC, the HG receives its share of the production (as profit oil); in the 
Service Contracts, the HG receives all revenues less the fees paid to the 
IOCs and eventually some costs.
99
 In both contracts, the IOCs might be 
subject to the payment of income tax, even though in some cases, the NOCs 
pay such taxes on behalf of the IOCs or the taxes are subject to 
reimbursement.
100
 
Regarding the PSC system and some Service Contracts, there is a 
discussion over which costs are recoverable and how such costs are 
reimbursed. The definition of the recoverable costs (e.g. exploration, 
development, production) and any necessary approvals for a cost to be 
integrated into the balance to be recovered are crucial for the economic 
appraisal of a PSC. Modern PSCs have also established monthly or annual 
limitations to the amount of cost oil as a percentage of the total production, 
delaying or even hindering the recovery of costs and investments.
101
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Although the concession system does not offer a direct cost recovery 
system it might implement a similar approach with depreciation, tax 
allowances and deductions (e.g. Norway) but with higher control to the HG 
as regulations might be more easily changed than contractual terms.  
There is a possibility for “ring-fencing”, where the host government 
limits (or expands) the taxable entities.
102 
Usually, cost recovery must be 
carried strictly on a field basis – in other words, if the costs are incurred in 
one field, they must be recovered from the same field.
103
 That being the 
case, IOCs with multiple fields cannot derive cost recovery throughout their 
different areas.
104
 Ring-fencing can also apply in relation to taxes and 
ensures that income from one project/area cannot be offset against another, 
to avoid “opportunistic behaviour” from IOCs.
105
 This might also apply if 
IOCs have operations in both the upstream and downstream and cannot 
offset losses and income from one sector to another.
106
 A tax and royalties 
regime might be less strict about ring-fencing as it is the case in the UK and 
Norway, which may result in tax losses for the HG, but may attract more 
investment in mature areas.
107
 
Regarding the Service Contract regime, one may wonder if the service 
will be based on ‘risk’ or ‘without risk’ system. In the first case, the RSC 
will be reasonably similar to the PSC structure as there should be risk, cost 
recovery and a “premium” to the investor in case it manages to find and 
develop a field. In the second case, the HG will take full control of 
ownership and risks related to the enterprise. Therefore, the investor will 
only receive a fee and maybe costs as compensation for their work. 
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Regardless of the different regimes described above, when setting up the 
fiscal regime, the host government has to hand a wide variety of tax and 
non-tax tools which may be applied to different HGI models, such as:
108
 
$ royalties; 
$ profit oil; 
$ “ring-fencing”; 
$ corporate income tax; 
$ resource rent tax; 
$ windfall tax; 
$ import and export duties; 
$ value-added tax; 
$ bonuses (e.g. exploration or discovery bonuses); 
$ state participation; 
$ environmental taxes; 
$ foreign exchange controls; 
$ performance bonds; and  
$ local content obligations. 
Different taxes or obligations have their advantages and disadvantages 
for the host governments and may affect positively or negatively the 
investment decisions to be taken by IOCs. If the country has significant 
proven reserves and a stable government, then it will have stronger leverage 
in negotiating fiscal terms and still be able to attract investments.
109
 
The above basic fiscal concepts are well-understood, but in a modern 
context, very flexible, and the old saying “one cannot judge a book by its 
cover” frequently applies.
110
 For example, some PSCs have a royalty clause 
which is common for a concession system.
111
 The trend is for countries to 
“copy” titles and structure, but “tweak” the economics and other provisions 
to suit particular HG needs
112
.  
Consequently, the HG must aim to create a fiscal system which can work 
effectively regardless of the price of oil and gas, so that HGIs will not have 
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to adjust the system each time the reference prices change, thereby creating 
more confusion and legal uncertainties and driving investors away. At the 
same time, the host government must be able to manage whatever system it 
opts for effectively. For example, in a PSC or RSC, the host government 
should have human resources available to verify and approve the costs 
recovery mechanisms promptly and with careful consideration.
113
 If they 
are not capable of doing so, then delay in reimbursement costs could impact 
the project by discouraging IOCs from investing, or might end up 
approving costs without proper diligence.
 114
 Alternatively, the relevant HG 
might increase their man-power, in order to gain such capabilities, or even 
outsource such tasks, but they should pay attention to the additional cost 
involved.  
For an IOC, its choice is largely based on achieving its internal rate of 
return justifying a particular investment.
115
 The IOC will also be interested 
in repatriating profits to its shareholders in home countries, whether such a 
system leads to a minimum number of front-end loaded non-profit-sensitive 
taxes, and if the host government has a transparent, predictable and stable 
policy environment, based on the best industry standards and practice.
116 
In 
addition, the existence of international treaties between the relevant 
stakeholders (i.e. investors home country and HG), such as the Energy 
Charter Treaty (ECT), a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) or a Double 
Taxation Treaty (DTT) might encourage foreign investments.  
Thus, the differences between a PSC, a concession or service models are 
determined by the factors mentioned above. Each HG will attempt to 
develop a regime that is attractive to the IOCs, while at the same time 
ensuring their share. Nevertheless, this is not always the case as some HGs 
end up establishing an aggressive fiscal system (e.g. Libyan production 
license rounds under EPSA IV terms end up with 95% of government take 
and some companies were bidding for it.)
 117
 
As stated earlier, IOCs might face the most significant disadvantages in 
the Service Contracts, where they only receive a fee and/or costs for the 
services provided to NOCs or HGs,  and are unable to book reserves or 
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receive the production as compensation for the investment made.
118
 IOCs 
would routinely avoid being in such a position, except, perhaps, for 
purposes of fostering a future relationship with the HGs and NOCs, or if the 
HGs offer attractive terms for such HGI.
119
  
After reviewing the risks and the tax system, the IOC will also weigh the 
opportunities in the country reviewed against other opportunities available 
worldwide, given that any company can only have a limited amount of 
investments at the same time.
120
 In this sense, creating joint ventures is an 
essential tool for IOCs to diversify their risks and portfolio.  
It is possible to attune almost any HGI to the desired fiscal system. For 
example, a concession arrangement could adopt a “cost recovery system” 
through depreciation, allowances and tax exemptions.
 121
 A concession 
system could request royalty in kind or a domestic market obligation to 
retain production.
122
 An RSC could allow some ownership rights and a 
method to book reserves. A profit sharing agreement could remove the cost 
recovery system. All systems could have State participation and some direct 
or indirect taxation.
 123
 Nevertheless, as discussed earlier, it might be easier 
to implement certain HGIs and to create their intended fiscal structures than 
it is others in different legal systems.
 124
 
From the IOC’s perspective, it is essential to mention the opportunity of 
being the “first mover” – i.e., the IOCs which receive the first HGIs in any 
given country would, in theory, benefit from the terms received upon 
discovery of oil and gas as they would take more risks.
125
 This principle is 
based on the idea that any host government will tend to grant HGIs with 
less favourable conditions to IOCs as their awareness of the reserves 
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available in their countries increases (i.e. lesser risks in comparison to the 
first mover).
126
 
This would represent a disadvantage for a new coming IOC.
127
 However, 
as they would be aware that other IOCs have already made discoveries in a 
particular country (thus reducing the exploratory risk) and that they can 
operate there (reducing the operational, marketing and infrastructure risks), 
the newcomers can assess whether the less favourable terms are in 
accordance with their risk evaluation, and make their investment decision 
accordingly.
128
 Political and legal risks are challenging to mitigate fully; 
this is why it is crucial for an investor to understand the stability of the 
country awarding the HGI and the implications of a potential direct or 
indirect expropriation.
129
  
Therefore, the form that the fiscal system takes relies on how a HG 
wishes to receive compensation in exchange for granting to IOCs the 
possibility to explore and produce the oil and gas resources in that 
country.
130
 As we have noted above, there are multiple combinations 
possible, and each will have its advantages and disadvantages – including 
whether a system is easier to manage but less flexible to adjust according to 
the development of the reserves. A theoretically ideal model may be too 
complicated to manage, especially for HGs that may have limited human 
resources to deal with such complexities.
131
 
5. The Pursuit of Stability and the Ever-Changing 
Host Governmental Agreement 
Given the long-term character of oil and gas petroleum agreements, IOCs 
are exposed to significant political risks.
132
  Throughout the existence of an 
HGI, governments, generations, and society change. This may lead to 
changes in the existent regulatory framework, the public perception 
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regarding the presence of foreign investment or different expectations 
regarding the fate or outcome of the HGI itself.
133
  At the same time, 
advances in technology as well as increased awareness regarding industry 
practices risks of pollution, or changes in market prices that affect State 
revenues may play a more important part in public policies addressing 
environmental concerns and sustainable practices. These are factors with an 
adverse impact on the original terms of the HGI and the envisioned 
outcomes of the agreement, which might lead certain HGs to request 
renegotiations, unilateral amendments of the initial terms or even the 
complete repudiation of the HGI by way of expropriation or nationalization. 
Therefore, the pursuit of stability remains one of the top priorities
134
 of the 
petroleum industry engaged in foreign-based operations.  
There are several forms of stabilization clauses implemented in HGIs. 
Each serves a unique purpose and strikes a certain balance of stability. 
Some common versions include: 
 A freezing clause:  This provides that laws applicable to operations 
specified in the HGI should be those laws and regulations that were in force 
at the time the contract was signed. Simply, it means that the contractors are 
guaranteed that they will not be subject to significant changes in governing 
legislation and future laws will not affect the HGI.  
Typically, freezing clause covers tax policy changes and therefore 
profitability of the project for the parties, especially in relation to newly 
introduced tax instruments that may adversely affect the financial 
circumstances of the parties.  
Example: The Contractor shall be subject to the provisions of 
this Contract as well as to all laws and regulations duly enacted 
by the Granting Authority and which are not incompatible or 
conflicting with the Convention and/or this Agreement. It is also 
agreed that no new regulations, modifications or interpretation 
which could be conflicting or incompatible with the provisions of 
this Agreement and/or the Convention shall be applicable.  – 
1989 Tunisian Model Production Sharing Contract, Article 24.1 
An equilibrium clause (also known as “hardship” provision) protects 
investors from laws and regulations adopted after the execution of the HGI 
by requiring the host government to indemnify the investors from and 
against the costs of complying with the new laws and regulations. 
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Depending on the negotiating strength of the investors and the host 
government's desire or need for the project and the investors' investment, 
these clauses may be full or limited.
135
  
Example: Where present or future laws or regulations of 
Turkmenistan or any requirements imposed on Contractor or its 
subcontractors by any Turkmen authorities contain any 
provisions not expressly provided for under this Agreement and 
the implementation of which adversely affects Contractor’s net 
economic benefits hereunder, the Parties shall introduce the 
necessary amendments to this Agreement to ensure that 
Contractor obtains the economic results anticipated under the 
terms and conditions of this Agreement. – 1997 Model 
Production Sharing Agreement for Petroleum Exploration and 
Production in Turkmenistan 
An intangibility clause provides that the HG cannot unilaterally modify 
or terminate the HGI. Instead of freezing the law, it simply says that the 
laws of the state that would effect the terms of the contract do not apply to 
that contract.  
Example: The Government of Libya will take all steps necessary 
to ensure that the Company enjoys all the rights conferred by 
this Concession. The contractual rights expressly created by this 
concession shall not be altered except by mutual consent of the 
parties. [...] 
     This Concession shall throughout the period of its validity be 
construed in accordance with the Petroleum Law and the 
Regulations in force on the date of execution [...]. Any 
amendment to or repeal of such Regulations shall not affect the 
contractual rights of the Company without its consent. – From 
Concession agreements Texaco signed with Libya Between 1955 
and 1966. 
The ‘Hybrid’ clause includes both freezing clause and intangibility 
clause. Its aim is to protect parties against destabilization and unilateral 
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actions.
136
  With these common forms and examples in mind we will dive 
into a deeper analysis of stability clause implementation.  
5.1. The Usual Suspect – The Host Government 
Generally, host States are presented and perceived as the main culprit
137
 
in the amendment of HGI motivated by their insatiable greed.
138
 Peter 
Cameron states that the long-term stability of concessions is affected by 
two aspects. On the one hand, is an opportunistic behaviour of the state that 
will constantly attempt to reduce the value of the project.
139
 On the other 
hand, are the HG’s attempts to capitalize on gains determined by sudden 
shifts in market behaviour (e.g. a significant increase of prices, which lead 
to significant gains for the company, but not for the state).
140
 Cameron 
argues such behaviour generates a lack of trust from the investors' side and 
creates periodic instability, which justifies the investors' pursuit of stability. 
As tools for changes caused by host States, Cameron refers to "a 
combination of regulatory and negotiation"
141
 and "nationalization."
142
   
However, the aforementioned might not be a holistic perception of this 
matter. Host States are also interested in stable long-term relationships just 
as much as investors and can suffer when investors engage in unsustainable 
maximization of profit, opportunistic behaviour,
143
 or when economic 
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situations
144
 disrupts the functioning of the petroleum agreement. The 
potential insolvency or economic hardship of the concessionaire/contractor 
may lead to suspension or cessation of operations and to possible retenders, 
which is detrimental to both states and their citizens. Renegotiations and 
requests for an increase of state support might happen whenever they are 
“deemed necessary” to maintain the viability of a project (at least from one 
party perspective), which indicates that flexibility is necessary for ensuring 
the proper functioning of a long-term agreement.
145
   
However, although co-interested in the stability of the agreement, States 
might enjoy less rights and possibilities to enforce it in certain instances 
(especially if the HG agrees to such conditions). The most blatant example 
is the fact that under the ECT, States cannot directly bring a claim against 
the investors for breach of the latter's obligations.
146
 This right is reserved 
solely to investors.  
At the same time, Cameron's point of view appears to be contradicted by 
the very data offered to support it. As Cameron puts it, "a higher state share 
of revenue […] has occasionally, been agreed with investors, in exchange 
for extensions to existing contract periods. These negotiations can be 
instigated by either government or company"
147
 (emphasis added). The 
wording is telling and nuances the overall image of the rapacious host state 
and so does empirical data. Host States face risks as well. During the 
financial crisis or during periods of massive drops in prices, investors faced 
default or even bankruptcy.
148
 In many of these cases, it was the IOC that 
sought a new agreement with a State. History recorded instances when 
IOCs amended unilaterally their own rules, thus affecting the outcome of 
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the concession in what regards the rights of the host State.
149
 Finally, the 
data points out that rarely have there been situations where the HG sought 
and obtained a modification of a HGI, without giving something in return.  
Cameron compiles a table with countries that amended their fiscal terms 
during 2002-2008 containing only those whose changes were deemed 
detrimental to investor's economic interests. The table reveals that most 
developed and democratic countries resort to same tactics employed by 
developing, high risk ones. Hence, next to States such as Argentina, 
Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Russia, or Venezuela, one finds Canada (Alberta and 
Newfoundland), the US (Alaska), the UK, Italy and Australia.
150
   
Although he presents it as a significant risk, Cameron also nuances the 
practical effects of nationalization: "although much of the political rhetoric 
refers to nationalization, the outcome is more of a result of new 
negotiations, with many investors remaining in the country."
151
  Our 
analysis reveals that Iran is the only country that unilaterally annulled a 
concession and immediately negotiated another (1933) and threatened 
nationalization (1951) in order to obtain more favourable terms. Otherwise, 
Middle Eastern countries resorted to concerted nationalizations only in 
1970's, when the decision had more to do with the geopolitical climate, than 
with pure economic interests. Our data confirms that where HGs perceive 
that contractual benefits are satisfactory (economic balance), the 
relationship with the IOC is stable.  
Otherwise, empirical evidence suggests that a high level of volatility is 
among the characteristics of HGI, notwithstanding the name of the HG. As 
time passes and governments' experience improves, peoples' expectations 
change, concession agreements change as well. The only thing that differs 
is the method. Hence, stability is in fact temporary, everywhere around the 
globe. As data suggests, in most of the developed countries, total stability in 
long term contracts is outright rejected (Norway, the UK, or the US). It 
plays more of a preventive or deterrent role than it is an achievement. Two 
questions arise. Is it possible to speak of stability in the context of HGIs? 
Should there even be stability in HGIs? If one considers the wording of 
bilateral investment treaties or of multilateral treaties such as the ECT, the 
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answer appears to be affirmative. However, the practical reality presents 
itself to be different. 
5.2. Are Petroleum Agreements Stable? 
Given the lack of experience of certain government negotiators and the 
might of the companies seeking concession, the terms offered were grossly 
unfair at the beginning of the 20
th
 century.
152
  As knowledge and bargaining 
power of HGs increased, the initial terms of the concessions have been 
subsequently amended on numerous occasions. In fact, history indicates 
that traditional concessions were a continuous renegotiation process, parties 
seeking either more equitable terms or to maintain their acquired rights. The 
history of petroleum agreements and regulation in developed countries does 
not seem to differ. Developed countries' governments' behaviour is similar 
to that of the Middle Eastern States that lacked both legislation and 
experience in dealing with oil and gas investors in the past.  
There is a significant amount of literature about attempts to make long-
term contracts in the oil and gas sector more stable. The reason the topic 
generates so much interest is that despite all efforts, HGIs cannot sit still. 
However, while everyone seems to notice the problem and propose 
solutions, very few focus on the inherent volatile nature of long-term 
agreements. At the same time, very little attention is given to the double 
standard applicable to different categories of States. For instance, following 
a classification of UNCTAD, Cameron distinguishes between transitional 
economies (CEE, Central Asia, and Balkan States) and developed countries 
(so called market states, such as Western Europe and the US), although, as 
it will be shown, empirical evidence seems to contradict the idea that HGIs 
are more stable in developed countries. 
5.2.2. A Double Standard?  
While there might be systemic differences between them, one cannot 
overlook the fact that "a significant number of HGs around the world do not 
offer a specific stabilization clause or any contract-based equivalent"
153
 or, 
the more striking observation, that "this is the default situation among 
market states."
154
  In other words, the same developed States making an 
                                                                                                             
 
 153. CAMERON, 2010, p 15. 
 154. Id. at 15-16. "Governments in the market states reject pleas for fiscal stability on the 
grounds that they cannot bind a future government to policies of the current administration 
since this would infringe sovereign rights and is almost certainly impossible in the context of 
their domestic legal traditions." (p. 16). See also footnote 18 where it is mentioned that "to 
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issue of stability in transitional countries do not see any problem with the 
lack of stability within their own borders.
155
   
One explanation for the obvious double standard lies in the "historical 
and cultural context", meaning that "in a number of developing or 
transitional states, the Rule of Law is either not firmly entrenched or does 
not operate in the way an investor from a market state would expect."
156
  As 
much as one would like to indulge this possible Western superiority 
complex, it makes no difference, for the loss caused by unilateral change is 
pecuniary, notwithstanding location. Developed States are simply more able 
to impose their will than developing ones. The best evidence is that despite 
high political risk, and the numerous changes or amendments in the Middle 
East concessions, foreign investors remained in the area simply because 
there was (still) a lot of profit to make.   
Two other, rather unconvincing, explanations concern: 1) the developing 
countries' dependency on the revenues generated by their oil and gas 
reserves and 2) the developed States' dependency on oil and gas imports. 
The former allegedly makes them more prone to change and opportunistic 
behaviour, but does not explain why the developed States, with diverse 
sources of revenue, behave in the same way. The latter makes stability a top 
priority for developed countries, however, does not explain why these 
States' governments do not offer stable long-term deals to investors within 
their own borders. At the same time, it fails to consider the disruptions in 
service provision or revenue collection, like those cause by the Iranian 
nationalization of 1951. 
5.3. Topical Analysis 
In this section we use a matrix of analysis in order to support with 
empirical evidence the fact that although an important aspect in 
negotiations and discourse regarding petroleum agreements, stabilization 
remains more of a myth, notwithstanding the type of HGI in place. In this 
regard we use both historical concessions in the Middle East – representing 
developing States – and the modern type of concession (license regimes) – 
representing developed Western countries. 
                                                                                                             
encourage compliance with its policies, the market state is able to use its discretionary 
powers over license allocation." 
 155. On the myth of stability in the US see: Lise Johnson & Oleksandr Volkov, Investor-
state contracts, host-state, commitments, and the myth of stability in international law, 24 
AMERICAN REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (2013) 
 156. CAMERON, 2010, p. 17. 
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A matrix of analysis regarding concession agreements is a challenging 
task, for several reasons. Primarily, there is no tested matrix yet. Secondly, 
there are significant idiosyncratic differences between the chosen groups of 
countries. When historical concessions were introduced in the Middle East, 
there was neither petroleum, nor tax legislation in place. The legal 
framework governing operations was limited to the concession agreement 
itself. These agreements were of obviously contractual nature, which might 
explain the constant process of renegotiation employed to redefine the 
relationship. Absent or underdeveloped regulation in the host countries 
together with the lack of balance between the benefits obtained by the 
parties involved may have been the causes for the lack of stability. As 
Middle Eastern governments learned the rules of the game and started 
developing a legal framework, the changes were bound to affect the 
existing concessions, with unforeseen results. Western jurisdictions appear 
to have taken the opposite route, by designing a legal framework and only 
afterwards entering concession agreements or granting licenses for 
operations. This might explain the apparent stability of the regime and of 
the concessions in place. However, evidence suggests that regulatory 
changes affected existing (granted) concessions (licenses), which means 
that both groups share comparable similarities. Therefore, the proposed 
matrix goes beyond systemic differences. Thirdly, mechanical descriptions 
of either agreements or legislations in place would not offer viable answers, 
and focus must be maintained on policy considerations and aims.  
We identified six topics for the analysis of HGI from the perspective of 
stabilization. These topics are: (1) amendments of the governing legal 
framework (by renegotiation or legislator intervention); (2) amendments of 
the tax or fiscal regime; (3) unilateral changes or termination; (4) 
nationalization; (5) State participation; and (6) reduction of concession's 
area.  
It must be stated here that the article is not of the opinion that an analysis 
based on these common elements will automatically answer or solve all 
dilemmas regarding the issue of stabilization. Other circumstances still need 
to be considered, such as: a) the actual wording of contracts or licenses, b) 
the existence of regulatory bodies and the powers granted to them, c) 
constitutional considerations, treaties entered and ratified, memberships in 
international organizations, d) regulatory capture, and e) the incidence of 
corruption. However, they do offer answers with respect to fundamental 
concerns of parties involved in HGI and reveal that, despite systemic 
differences, their aims are fundamentally the same and addressed in similar 
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manners. As such, the analysis shows that the issue of stabilization 
transcends legal systems and remains largely unattainable. 
 
 
Country 
 
Iran 
 
Iraq 
 
Kuwait 
 
Saudi Arabia 
 
Denmark 
 
Norway 
 
The UK 
 
Type of HGI 
 
 
Concession 
 
Concession 
 
Concession 
 
Concession 
 
Concession 
(License) 
 
License 
 
License 
 
State Participation 
 
No157 
 
 
No158 
 
No 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes159 
 
Yes* 
 
Renegotiation 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
  
                                                                                                             
 157. The Persian Government was denied participation in the D'Arcy Concession both in 
management and in equity. MIKDASHI, 196634 
 158. The Iraqi Government requested native participation from the first concession 
granted in 1925. However, the foreign companies opposed it and Iraq held no equity until 
the 1970s nationalizations 
 159. Petroleum operations were only possible based on a concession issued by the state, 
with the state company (Statoil) getting a share in each of them. HUNTER, 2015, pp. 144-145 
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Unilateral 
amendments/ 
Termination 
 
Yes160 
 
Yes161 
 
No 
 
No162 
 
Yes163 
 
Yes 
 
Yes164 
 
Fiscal/Tax 
Amendment 
 
Yes165 
 
Yes166 
 
Yes167 
 
Yes168 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes169 
                                                                                                             
 160. The D'Arcy Concession was unilaterally canceled in 1932 and replaced by a new 
concession agreement in 1933. However, both parties appear to have wanted a new 
agreement and there was no punitive action. The sole truly unilateral move made by the 
Iranians, was the nationalization of 1951, which is addressed separately. 
 161. Following failed negotiations regarding the relinquishment of concession areas, in 
1961 the Iraqi government passed a law by which it reduced the concessionaire's acreage to 
the fields operated at that moment. Hence, via law, the government unilaterally modified the 
terms of the concession agreement, reducing the concession area from 16,000 square miles 
to 740 square miles only (a reduction of 99.5%). MIKDASHI, 1966, p. 208. 
 162. The decision of the Saudi government to enter into an agreement with Onassis to 
create a national tanker company, in order to increase its revenues from oil exports, may be 
considered an attempt to unilaterally amend the terms of the 1933 concession agreement. 
The deal, concluded in 1954, was disputed by the company, which alleged a breach of the 
1933 concession that gave them the right to use their own transport, thus severely cutting the 
possibility of Saudi oil exports. The dispute was referred to arbitration and, in 1963, the 
tribunal held that the Onassis deal violated the concession agreement and emphasized that 
the 'stabilization clause' was binding on the host state https://www.trans-lex.org/260800/ 
_/aramco-award-ilr-1963-at-117-et-seq/, page 197, last visited on 23.05.2017.).  Saudi's 
compliance with the arbitral award meant that the attempt to unilaterally amend the 
concession agreement's terms and regain their legislative sovereignty had suffered a bitter 
defeat, despite an obvious national interest thereof.  
 163. In 1980 Denmark invited concessionaires to negotiations, based on the aggravated 
energy situation, requiring among others an increase in exploration operations, a 
relinquishment of 50% of all areas by 1982 and relinquishment of all non-producing areas by 
1985 as well as the right to purchase 50% of the produced oil at preferential discounted 
prices. Since no agreement could be reached, the government's proposal was submitted to 
the Parliament to be turned into law, which basically resulted in expropriation. T. DAINTITH, 
THE LEGAL CHARACTER OF PETROLEUM LICENCES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY   (University of 
Dundee, Centre for Petroleum and Mineral Law Studies, 1981), ADDENDUM (following p. 
175). 
 164. In 1975, the legislative decided to amend all licenses' terms by new legislation.  
 165. As history has it, D'Arcy would have wanted to pay revenues of only 10% but in the 
end 16% was accepted as a "quid pro quo for complete fiscal exemption" (MIKDASHI, 1966, 
pp. 12-14). The Persian government became unsatisfied with the unclear and arbitrary 
amounts it received as a result of the concession (there is evidence of significant deliberate 
royalty evasion and lack of transparency and unfair practices in accounting), which led to a 
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renegotiation and the adoption of an "interpretative agreement" in 1920, establishing a new 
method of computing the government's revenues that further depleted the government's 
earnings (id. at 35-39). Merely a decade later, in an attempt to raise its receipts from the 
exploitation of its natural resources, Persia enacted an income tax law to which the 
concessionaire refused to submit (id. at 40). In 1933, a new concession agreement was 
signed with APOC which linked royalties to tonnage giving also the Persian government a 
share in the company's dividends. Additional financial terms ensured a minimum annual 
payment of 750,000 GBP (id. at 77). After the short-lived nationalization of 1951, Iran 
entered into a new concession agreement with a Consortium of companies in 1954. The new 
concession provided the Iranian government with a bigger share of the profits – 60% instead 
of 50%, stemming from the fact that large portions of the exported oil went to non-affiliates, 
at significant discounts, which were not eligible for tax deductions. However, although the 
Consortium endeavored to observe the agreement, the government and the national oil 
company still had their grievances, regarding an increase in volume of production, profit 
margins of refineries or the unilateral modification of the posted price by the Consortium, 
having adverse effects on their income. Id. at 223-224. 
 166. The 1925 concession agreement contained a complete fiscal exemption (id. at 67). 
However, the Iraqi government seemed to have been more aware than their Persian 
counterparts in 1901, for they wanted royalties to be based on a sliding scale, varying 
directly with the company’s profits and included from the outset a provision stating that 
changes in royalty rates were to be made once every ten years (id. at 68). In 1931 there were 
already disputes regarding the payment of royalties, due to British renunciation of the gold 
standard and depreciation of the GBP. Negotiations were resumed in 1949 due to the 
devaluation of the GBP which led to another amendment of the agreement in 1950. Only 
four months later, the 50-50 method of payment was introduced in Saudi Arabia, which 
immediately determined the Iraqi government to solicit and obtain a similar treatment in 
1952 (id. at 152). In 1957 Iraq started disputing the amortization costs and deductible 
expenses of the company, which diminished the profits and the government's share. An 
agreement thereof was reached in 1961 (id. at 199). At the same time the government tried to 
renegotiate the overall financial terms based on a provision of the 1952 agreement, however, 
in 1962 the company refused to amend them stating that the circumstances mentioned in the 
agreement were not met.  Id. at 205. 
 167. The concession's financial terms were amended in 1951, after several years of 
negotiations. Additional payments were introduced in the same year as a result of the Kuwait 
Income Tax Regulations (id. at , p. 153). A subsequent amendment occurred in 1955, given 
that both US and British tax departments disputed the income tax imposed by the Kuwait 
government. As a result, a gradual income tax was introduced and applied on all companies 
making business in Kuwait (id. at 216). Nonetheless, Kuwait received also a 25 million GBP 
as a price for the amendment. 1955 was also the year when the discounts on posted prices 
started being reduced, with two follow ups in 1961 and 1964. Id. at 216. 
 168. Disputes concerning method of payment occurred in Saudi Arabia in 1948, when an 
agreement was entered settling at the dollar price of a gold sovereign for situations where the 
US and Saudi prices were divergent id. at 121). Delays caused by the war led to an extension 
of 6 year of the initial term, while the company also obtained a 2 year 10% discount on 
payments made in dollars (id. at 121). Financial negotiations were resumed in late 1940s as 
Saudi Arabia challenged the right of the US government to tax profits arising from the 
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exploitation of Saudi natural resources and attempted to amend the financial terms of the 
1933 concession. In 1950, a retroactive agreement was reached. Moreover, the Saudis 
introduced an income tax law and managed to impose a "supplementary tax" ensuring that 
payments to the government reached 50% of the net operating revenue of the company (id. 
at 148-149. Also: BERNARD TAVERNE, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE REGULATION OF THE 
PETROLEUM INDUSTRY: LAWS, CONTRACTS, AND CONVENTIONS   (Graham & Trotman, 1994), 
p. 42). In return, the company gained several monetary advantages (MIKDASHI, 1966, p. 
150). Just one year later, the Saudi government raised the question of applicability of foreign 
tax to its share of the profits. As a result, in 1952 the 1950 agreement was revised to provide 
for a split of profits before payment of US taxes (id. at 150). Soon after, disputes regarding 
discounts in price offered to company affiliates, resulted in a settlement of 70 million USD 
(id. at 186). Since the government still felt it does not have a say in determining deductible 
expenses for income tax calculations, a new agreement was signed in 1963, giving the right 
to the government to refuse deductions. Id. at 185. 
 169. The UK's take on petroleum operations is a combination of licensing fees, area 
rental fees and various taxes, including corporation tax, supplementary charge to corporation 
tax and, for fields developed before 1993 a petroleum revenue tax. The alleged purpose is 
maximizing the state's income without affecting ongoing investments in mature areas or 
frontier areas. The corporation tax is currently at 30%, while the supplementary charge that 
tried to capture excess profit during a period of high prices was initially set at 10% but 
reached 32% in 2011. Another review of oil and gas fiscal terms was scheduled for 2015. 
The often increases were perceived as nothing more than blatant "cash grabs" by a 
government struggling with the effects of the financial crisis. HUNTER, 2015, p. 117. Yet, 
there is no evidence of legal challenge or lack of compliance with the state's opportunistic 
behavior. 
 170. In 1948, Iran renegotiated the 1933 concession financial terms, which resulted in the 
1950 "supplemental agreement" that preserved the basic method of calculation, but raised 
the rates. However, the Parliament refused to ratify the agreement. As news of better terms 
offered to neighboring countries emerged, Iran started discussing the potential 
nationalization of the oil industry. In reply, the concession holder offered to negotiate a new 
agreement regarding the equal division of production profits. It was too late. In 1951, the 
Parliament voted for nationalization. MIKDASHI, 1966, pp.154-155. 
 171. The initial concession covered an area of 500,000 square miles (almost 4/5 of Persia' 
territory). In 1933, upon signing of the new concession, Iran sought and obtained a reduction 
of the concession area to 100,000 square miles, at the company's choice. 
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Stabilization Clauses 
 
No 
 
No 
 
No 
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No** 
 
No 
 
No 
        
 
* UK state participation decreased in the recent years and the state does not partake 
anymore in HGI. 
** A stabilization clause was negotiated and inserted in the extension of the 
concession granted to Moller, however this did not preclude the Danish state from 
amending its tax system. 
 
  
                                                                                                             
 172. The initial surface was of 196 square miles, but a first renegotiation in 1929 
extended it to an exclusive area of 35,125 square miles (MIKDASHI, 1966, p. 71.).  Another 
75 years concession was granted to an independent oil group in 1932 over an area of 41,302 
square miles on far more favorable terms to the Iraqi government. Notwithstanding the 
governmental attempt to encourage competition, Iraq Petroleum Company managed to 
secure control over the new concession in 1937 and in 1938, via another associate, gained an 
additional 75 years concession over another 87,236 square miles, thus covering the entirety 
of the country (id. at 73. Also: TAVERNE, 1994, p. 34.). Subsequent negotiations ensued in 
1961 regarding the relinquishment of vast concession areas. The company offered to 
relinquish 75% of the area at one and a further 15% over the next 7 years, an offer that was 
rejected by the Iraqis and led to a suspension of both negotiations and drilling operations. As 
a result, the Iraqi government then passed a law restricting the concession area of IPC to the 
fields operated at that moment. 
 173. In the 1948 agreement it was stated that by 1960 Aramco will relinquish 140,413 
square miles in the exclusive area and 135,200 square miles in the preferential area (. In 
1950, the company agreed to a complete relinquishment of its preferential area and a gradual 
relinquishment of its exclusive area that was reduced to 105,000 square miles. MIKDASHI, 
1966, p. 193. 
 174. In 1976, the parties of the Danish sole concession reached an agreement by which, 
among others, a schedule for gradual relinquishment of areas was established and state 
interests in building a pipeline was acknowledged. Only 3 years later, the Danish 
government was asking the concessionaires to agree on a much faster program of 
relinquishment. In 1980, it invited the concessionaires to new (and specific) negotiations, 
based on the aggravated energy situation, requiring among others an increase in exploration 
operations, a relinquishment of 50% of all areas by 1982 and relinquishment of all non-
producing areas by 1985 as well as the right to purchase 50% of the produced oil at 
preferential discounted prices. Since no agreement could be reached, the government's 
proposal was submitted to the Parliament to be turned into law, which would have resulted 
in expropriation. Because of governmental pressures the agreement was modified in 1981 in 
a radical manner so that by 1986 the concessionaires relinquished all their Danish territories 
and retained only their North Sea producing fields. Out of these, 25% were relinquished in 
2000 and 25% were relinquished in 2005. DAINTITH, 1981, p. 173 and the following. 
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The topical analysis proves that despite systemic differences, aims and 
policies of host States do not differ. Legal and contractual principles do not 
stand in the way of parties seeking out better terms on their agreement. 
Despite their terms and governing principles, HGIs appear to be more 
volatile than stable. 
Historical concession agreements concluded in the Middle East were 
characterized by (very) long-term duration and high level of volatility. The 
contracting relationship has been a continuous renegotiation during which 
the conflicting interests of the parties involved sought a better balance and a 
(more) equitable distribution of wealth generated by the exploitation of the 
host state's natural resources. The political risk was deemed high, however, 
so were the returns of the oil and gas industry active in the area. HGs also 
benefitted. As time went by, it was also observed a development in the 
attitude of the government, seeking less income in a short period of time 
and trying to answer more the aspiration of the population as major 
stakeholders.
175
  
It should not be inferred from the aforementioned examples that the 
constant negotiation and amendment of terms is only provoked by the HG 
who are not interested in stable business relationships. Evidence shows that 
in many occasions the companies themselves asked for changes in terms. At 
the same time, governments do not usually gain from volatility, for their 
main objective remains to insure a stable revenue source to their budgets.
176
 
Iran's loss of revenues due to the unilateral cancellation of the concession 
makes a perfect example.  
The volatility of the concession agreements is linked with the ever-
changing circumstances of the global oil market, the volatility of the price, 
changes in companies' business policies or practices, importing states' laws, 
competition with other host countries, desire to gain control over a 'public 
service' or 'national security' aspects, wide spread of information and 
standardization of terms, and experience in negotiation. The wide number 
of factors influencing the existing agreements, combined with their long-
term duration simply does not add up to stability. The answer to the 
question whether concession agreements should be stable at all is addressed 
in the conclusion. 
                                                                                                             
 175. MIKDASHI, 1966, p. 237. 
 176. Id. at 239. Data indicates that as long as the oil prices remained at a convenient level 
or increased, states were satisfied with their revenues and the computing methods used to 
calculate their share. The reverse caused an opposite reaction and led to new negotiations.  
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6. Discussion  
HGIs contain different levels of control and rights in the Upstream 
sector. Due to recent developments in the sector, certain hybrids and 
crossbreeds have been created where a mixture of a concession/license is 
present in a PSC or vice-versa or in an RSC.
 177
 There is much proof of this 
in the model contracts developed by both international organisations and 
various national governments.
 178
 
 
Table 1: Comparison of Concession, PSC and Service Contract Terms 
 
Elements Concession 
Production 
Sharing 
Contracts 
(PSC) 
Services Contracts 
Pure Service Risk Service 
Risk 
The investor 
takes all 
financial and 
technical risks. 
 
All financial 
and technical 
risks are taken 
by the investor. 
Usually applied 
in high-risk 
areas with 
limited 
hydrocarbon 
developments. 
 
All financial and 
technical risks are 
taken by HG. 
It is usually 
granted in a low-
risk area with the 
high potential of 
hydrocarbon 
resources. 
The investor 
takes all financial 
and technical 
risks. 
Usually applied 
in high-risk areas 
with limited 
hydrocarbon 
developments. 
Control 
The HG tends 
to have limited 
control in the 
management 
over petroleum 
operations. 
The HG tends to 
have higher 
control in the 
management 
over petroleum 
operations. 
The HG tends to 
have total control 
in the management 
over petroleum 
operations. 
The HG tends to 
have total control 
in the 
management over 
petroleum 
operations. 
Ownership 
The HG tend 
to own all the 
reserves in the 
country. 
 
The HG owns 
all the reserves 
in the country. 
 
 
The HG owns all 
the reserves and 
production in the 
country. 
 
 
The HG owns all 
the reserves and 
production in the 
country. 
 
  
                                                                                                             
 177.  Tade Oyewunmi, ‘Natural Gas Exploration and Production in Nigeria and 
Mozambique: Legal and Contractual Issues’ [2015] OGEL 1 (2015). 
 178.  Oyewunmi (n 177). 
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Production 
Split 
Contractor 
tends to own 
all production. 
 
The contractor 
usually receives 
its share from 
the production. 
 
The contractor has 
no rights over the 
discovered and 
produced oil 
and/or gas 
resources. 
 
The contractor 
has no right over 
the discovered 
and produced oil 
and gas 
resources. 
 
Marketing 
 
Each party is 
free to do their 
marketing of 
the oil/gas 
produced. 
However, in 
some 
jurisdictions, 
royalties can 
be paid in kind 
and/or 
domestic 
market 
obligations can 
be secured at 
an agreed 
price. 
 
Each party is 
free to do their 
marketing of the 
oil/gas 
produced. 
However, in 
some 
jurisdictions, 
domestic market 
obligations can 
be secured at 
the agreed price. 
Marketing of the 
oil/gas produced 
under the control 
of HG. 
Marketing of the 
oil/gas produced 
under the control 
of HG. 
Fiscal 
System 
HG collected 
rents, royalty 
and /or taxes. 
HG usually 
does not 
participate or 
support in any 
cost recovery 
system even 
though some 
countries 
could provide 
tax exemptions 
and 
depreciation 
procedures 
similar to the 
cost recovery 
system. 
The contractor 
receives agreed 
percentage of 
the production 
to cover its 
costs and the 
remaining of the 
production 
distributed 
between the HG 
and the 
contractor. 
 
Tax may be 
settled by NOC 
on behalf of the 
contractor or 
should be paid 
separately to the 
HG. 
HG pays the 
contractor agreed 
amount for the 
work. 
 
Tax may be settled 
by NOC on behalf 
of the contractor or 
should be paid 
separately to the 
HG. 
The contractor 
receives the 
agreed fees and 
costs of the 
production. The 
remaining of the 
production goes 
to the HG. 
 
Tax may be 
settled by NOC 
on behalf of the 
contractor or 
should be paid 
separately to the 
HG. 
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6.1. Does it matter what type of HGI the HG offer? Why and for whom? 
It is not straightforward to determine which HGI is the most beneficial. 
In reality, it is not possible to say that one HGI is better than another, but it 
may be possible to find the most suitable HGI to suit the expectations of the 
particular country in which the exploration and production is to take 
place.
179
 The political situation of each country will undoubtedly influence 
the type of HGI chosen, both to provide the best protection for the national 
interest, and attract investors as a result of past experiences or the history of 
upstream sector in that particular country.
180
   
In this sense, it is possible to suggest that perception and reputation are 
relevant for any upstream investment as well as for any HG consideration 
before creating or modifying its legal system.
 
For example, concessions do 
not possess a “positive” connotation in developing countries due to past 
connections with the colonial period and highly unfavourable terms towards 
the HG. More recently, Mexico changed its constitution (after a long period 
of State monopoly and restrictions against sharing oil and gas resources) 
and allowed other HGIs to be awarded apart from the service contract 
(including licenses and PSCs), but still does not allow a concession 
agreement as a clear sign against the term “concession”. A contract-based 
system is also more likely to be used in a jurisdiction without a highly 
developed legal system where there might be a perceived necessity to 
provide further details in a contract.  
It is possible to suggest that PSCs are more common in countries where 
the industry has been profoundly affected by the political situation and 
higher geological and financial risks (i.e. Africa and Asia).
181
 In these cases, 
PSCs ensure that the HGs maintain closer control of its resources and 
participates entirely or at least significantly in the oil and gas industry. HG 
in developed economies are not heavily dependent on oil and gas activities, 
and the private sector tends to determine most of these activities, based on 
the following of specific rules (minimum work program, HSE, etc.) with 
some exceptions in the European Nordic region with higher and direct 
governmental intervention in the upstream sector.
182
 This soft governmental 
approach is favoured by the concession or license regime while Service 
                                                                                                             
 179.  Smith and others (n 1). 
 180. Toyin Falola and Ann Genova, The Politics of the Global Oil Industry: An 
Introduction (Greenwood Publishing Group 2005) 18. 
 181. Raymond F Mikesell, Petroleum Company Operations and Agreements in the 
Developing Countries. (Routledge, London 1984). 
 182.  Terence Daintith, ‘Discretion in the Administration of Offshore Oil and Gas -A 
Comparative Study’ [2006] OGEL. 
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Contracts take a more conservative approach as the HG takes complete 
control of upstream activities and permits the private sector minor 
participation (e.g. the Middle East).
183
  
The most critical element of these HGIs is that the parties involved 
receive precisely what is intended from the agreement and that all terms and 
conditions are met.
184
This is crucial because the nature of conflicting 
interests and objectives of major parties in the HGIs means that it is 
necessary to create a perfect balance between such discrepancies in order to 
achieve a successful agreement for upstream activities. 
6.2. Flexibility 
A far better deal can be drawn up based on the understanding of either 
party’s wants or needs. The already cyclical nature of the oil and gas 
industry will continue to be affected by privatisation and nationalisation of 
resources, market liberalisation and global and regional geopolitics.
185
 
Creating a balance between risk and reward will be an essential element in 
successful business ventures in the future, and an understanding of the ever-
changing nature of this industry will go a long way to helping establish this 
balance.
186
  
Despite the difference between the details included in the contracts it is 
important to establish two key issues: 1) the division of profit between the 
government and IOCs, and 2) how resources are to be controlled. In certain 
circumstances, negotiations become incredibly complicated when there are 
high levels of uncertainty arising from the high-risk nature of the business 
as well as a lack of information.
187 
Typically, neither party in the agreement 
can predict, when signing the contract, the exact costs involved in the total 
exploration of a contract and the development of a field; how much oil or 
gas exists in the field; or whether future oil or gas prices will justify the 
expenditure.
188
 The average rate of success is not high. Exploration efforts 
on nine out of ten concessions result in a loss.
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 187. Gamal Abou-elkhair, ‘Oil & Gas Contracts ’ Risks Negotiation in the Climate of 
Economic Recession’, Society of Petroleum Engineer (2015). 
 188.  Abou-elkhair (n 182). 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2020
68 Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal [Vol. 5 
  
 
There is significant pressure on the HG to negotiate and manage 
agreements in order to produce the “best” possible contract.
 189
 There is also 
pressure upon society as a whole, parliamentarians and the media to hold 
accountable both governments and investors. The complex nature of 
contracts drawn up for large natural resource investments raises challenges 
for those negotiating, implementing and reviewing contracts.
190
 There is 
increasing importance given to issues revolving around Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR), sustainability and environmental protection.
 191
 
This is why HGI should be designed in a way that provides flexibility in 
order to absorb these challenging circumstances, higher expectations from a 
variety of different stakeholders and uncertainties involving the upstream 
sector. As shown in Section 5, empirical evidence clearly suggests that 
flexibility, rather than stability, is one of the common denominators of all 
HGIs throughout history.  
6.3.  Will there be a carried interest?  
Carried Interest is a sole risk scenario where the party or parties with 
working interest agree to bear the costs of another working interest. The 
carried party will have to pay those costs and generally will have to pay 
some risk premium to the carrying party if production comes out of that 
carrying event. This is commonly seen in Joint operating agreements in 
nonconsent operations.  
In the HGI context carried interest depends on the regime set up by the 
HG and its goals.  It is quite common to see the NOC be carried by the IOC 
when NOC participation is necessary.
192
 For example, regardless of the 
HGI type, the HG law may require that the IOC pay all of the exploration 
and development costs of the granted area.  In return the IOC will be able to 
deduct those costs from the production or revenue earned once commercial 
production begins. Depending on commercial factors, this may be a risk 
that the IOC is willing to take. 
193
 
Generally speaking, a historical concession agreement (i.e one that does 
not involve an NOC) does not bring up carried interest issues with regards 
                                                                                                             
 189.  Talus, Looper and Otillar (n 2). 
 190. Ingilab Ahmadov and others, ‘How to Scrutinize a Production Sharing Agreement’ 
[2012] London: IIED. 
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to the overarching HGI since the government is not working the field or pay 
for its share when it does (i.e. Norway and Brazil). However, there are 
HGIs that bear the name concession that one should be mindful of carrying 
interest (i.e. Morocco).  Production Sharing Agreements (PSA) will quite 
often contain a carrying provision since governments generally require that 
the NOC be involved in this type of development scheme and less “mature” 
NOCs might not be able to pay for its bills (e.g. Kenya and Mozambique). 
Lastly, what about carried interests in service contracts?  In the standard 
service contract, there is not a carried interest issue. The IOC does the work 
and is paid with oil or currency for performing its contractual duties. 
However, in a risk service contract, the IOC agrees to take carry the costs 
and later recover those costs in oil or currency depending on the agreement 
struck.
194
  
6.4.  Confidentiality and Transparency 
From the above it follows that when deciding which HGI to select it is 
important to have an awareness of the significant need for confidentiality 
involved in awarding such contracts, as well as an excellent working 
knowledge of the terms included in the contract, with particular attention 
paid to the fiscal element.
195
 The high level of confidentiality and, therefore, 
the apparent lack of transparency surrounding these contracts has become 
the center of some heated political debates, which include politicians, and 
members of society.
196
 The lack of transparency could potentially act as a 
cover-up for corruption, which may exist under such levels of 
confidentiality or secrecy.
197
  
It is necessary for oil and gas contracts, subcontracts and regulations to 
become completely transparent and made public if claims of corruption and 
foul play are to be disproved.
 198
 This is a difficult task for these contracts 
are traditionally extremely complex and parties are reluctant to disclose 
their terms, which could leave them open to corruption.
199
 In Norway, for 
example, the awarding of each license and the criteria used to establish the 
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award is recorded in the public domain.
200
 It is only in these instances that 
the public can adequately judge the effectiveness and stability of the 
agreements as well as the decision-making of public servants and 
government officials who were involved in the creation of the contracts.
201
 
7.  Conclusion   
Based on the previous sections, several concluding points can be made. 
The first point is that the best HGI will depend on the terms and conditions 
agreed upon by the parties. In other words, it is not a matter of which type, 
but one of negotiation. Different HGIs could offer advantages and benefits, 
but any HGI can be adjusted to fit most interests. The second point is that 
the political, cultural and legal backgrounds of each country are equally 
relevant for they might prevent certain HGI from being negotiated. The 
clearest example is that of historical concessions in the Middle East. The 
third point is that the expectations of the relevant stakeholders might vary 
from country to country (e.g. export or import based, robust economic 
development or not) and investor to investor (e.g. small, large, major oil 
and gas companies). This is why in principle any HGI could work in any 
given country. The fourth point is that it is difficult to implement a stable 
HGI in a long-term project. This is why some countries simply do not offer 
stability (i.e. most Western countries) or end up re-negotiating at some 
point. Flexibility remains the key to a successful long-term cooperation of 
parties in HGI.
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Appendix - Summaries and Examples of Host Government Instruments  
8. Summaries and Examples Host Government Instruments Mentioned 
As mentioned previously, the contractual types of HGIs are grouped into 
three main categories; (1) Concession Agreements (2) PSCs and (3) Service 
Contracts. It is possible that a fourth option could exist in the form of joint 
venture agreement and a fifth option in the form of hybrid contract, in 
which some countries might create an HGI that combines features of 
different regimes.
202
 A sixth category would be a preliminary contract 
without exclusive rights, such as a reconnaissance contract or study 
agreement, which could lead to one of the three main aforementioned 
contracts.
 
 
The key summary behind each of these three main types of HGIs along 
with relevant practical examples will be described below.  
8.1. Concession Agreement  
The petroleum concession
203
 is an agreement that grants title of the oil 
and gas resources (which may include reserves) to the International Oil 
Company (IOC) that is developing these resources. Historically, the 
agreement conferred exclusive rights within large areas for long periods 
against a mere obligation to pay some smaller bonuses, annual sums, and/or 
royalties.
204
 Otherwise, the concession holders were exempted from any 
taxes or duties, including income/profit tax.
205
 One famous example is the 
                                                                                                             
 202. For example, this might be a PSC with a royalty system or a Service Contract with a 
buy-back option as we will analyze later in this paper. In addition, the host government 
could offer more than one HGI in different areas of the country or at different bidding 
rounds. However, for the purposes of this paper we will focus on these 3 conventional types 
of HGI. 
 203. This subsection draws upon Section I.A. Petroleum Concessions,  from Catalin 
Gabriel Stanescu, Eduardo G Pereira & Aaron Koenck – Petroleum Concessions, Licenses 
and Leases: “Same-Same but Different”?, LSU Journal of Energy Law and Resources, Vol 
VIII, 2019, forthcoming, p. 6-9. 
 204. RAYMOND F. MIKESELL, PETROLEUM COMPANY OPERATIONS AND AGREEMENTS IN 
THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES   (Taylor and Francis.London, 2016), p. 21 and fn 3. 
 205. TAVERNE, supra note 1, at33. For instance, the D’Arcy concession established 
revenues of 16% as a “quid pro quo for complete fiscal exemption.” See ZUHAYR MIKDASHI, 
A FINANCIAL ANALYSIS OF MIDDLE EASTERN OIL CONCESSIONS, 1901-65, 12–14 (F. A. 
Praeger 1966). The 1925 Iraqi concession agreement also contained a complete fiscal 
exemption. See ibid67. The worst situation appears to have been in Kuwait, where the 
royalty payments were lower than in all neighboring countries, doubled by a complete lack 
of guarantees. See id. at 82-83; see also TAVERNE, supra note 1, at 41. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2020
72 Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal [Vol. 5 
  
 
D’Arcy Concession (Persia, 1901) that granted its holder an exclusive right 
over almost the entire country for a term of 60 years and did not impose any 
tax liability towards the state.
206
 Similar terms existed in concessions 
granted by Iraq,
207
 Saudi Arabia,
208
 or Kuwait.
209
  
The contextual background which “allowed” the original petroleum 
concessions to be awarded no longer exist.
210
 It is unthinkable that another 
D’Acry
211
 or S. Pearson & Son
212
 concession will ever be implemented 
again. Traditional type of concessions have been removed and replaced 
with agreements more favorable to the host nation. Many social, 
environmental, economic, and political pressures have forced new versions 
of concessions, along with new types of granting instruments that better 
serve the purposes of individuals and governments alike.
213
 In fact, the 
abandonment of the old concession system is a product of many developing 
nation-states asserting their sovereignty and increasing sophisticated 
political systems.
214
  
A concession agreement is drawn up for the HG to grant exclusive rights 
to a concessionaire to explore and produce hydrocarbon resources in a 
given area over a certain period. The agreement will set out the terms and 
conditions that cover the payment, assessed on production, of taxation by 
the concessionaire. On signing the agreement, the concessionaire has the 
right to: conduct exploration and if successful to develop any discovery 
resulting from that exploration; to take ownership of the oil and gas 
produced; and to dispose of such production without restriction. While 
some HGs issue a license that covers both E&P, others only issue a license 
for the initial exploration, which may lead the host government to issue a 
production concession if any commercial discovery is made. HGIs need to 
ensure that, if the initial exploration was successful, the concessionaire does 
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not encounter any unreasonable obstacles in obtaining a production 
concession. 
It is important to mention the classification of concession agreements. 
The literature identifies two theories concerned with determining the legal 
nature of concession agreements. On one hand, they are perceived as 
contracts, which confers upon them a binding character (historical Middle 
East concessions),
215
 meaning that unilateral change or termination entitles 
the aggrieved party to obtain compensation.
216
 On the other hand, the 
concessions are perceived as hybrid forms – such as administrative 
contracts, governed by a special set of rules, addressing and imposing limits 
to the pressing issue of unilateral change, without banning it altogether 
(France, Germany, Brazil, the Danish Sole Concession and to a certain 
extent, Romania).
217
 
A creation of French law, the administrative contract is subject to the 
regulatory power of the state and therefore allows for modification of the 
contract pursuant to the state's regulatory powers that would not be allowed 
between purely private parties.
218
 A further interaction between the public 
and private nature of concessions occurs in certain legal systems, which 
either require parliamentary approval of the concession, by a specific law or 
are considering such requirements for their legal system (e.g. Ghana, 
Tunisia, Iran, and Azerbaijan).
219
  
                                                                                                             
 215. TERENCE DAINTITH, THE LEGAL CHARACTER OF PETROLEUM LICENCES: A 
COMPARATIVE STUDY 223 (University of Dundee, Centre for Petroleum and Mineral Law 
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determining whether the license is a contract or a regulatory act, see HAMMERSON, supra 
note 7,  at 62–63. 
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AFRICA (Willis L. M. Reese, Foreign Parker School of and Law Comparative eds, 1967).  
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Countries that have adopted and still use the system of concessions or 
any of its  variations (e.g. licenses or leases) include North America (led by 
US and Canada), Europe (led by Norway, the UK, Sweden, Denmark and 
the Netherlands), South American  (led by Brazil and Argentina); others 
include Australia, South Africa, Morocco and New Zealand.
220
 
8.1.1. Practical Example: Brazilian Concession Agreement 
The Brazilian upstream sector has suffered several changes within its 
history. Initially it started as a “free market” system between the late 19
th
 
and early 20
th
 centuries. Later it moved to a nationalistic and state 
monopoly for nearly five decades under the control of Petrobras, then it re-
opened the market at the end of the 20
th
 century under a competitive licence 
regime. More recently it moved back to create a higher level of state 
intervention as it changed from the licence regime  that existed in the in late 
1990’s to a hybrid regime created by the combination of a licence regime 
and production sharing regime. But why?  
The Brazilian government could have arranged its fiscal system in order 
to achieve the same financial income irrespective of the model adopted. 
From a legal or economic point of view it was not required to move from a 
single licence regime since the late 90’s to a hybrid regime with licence and 
production sharing regime at this present moment. This process would have 
been fairly straightforward as the royalty and special participation processes 
were already in place and could have been increased in order to achieve the 
same financial benefits expected from the new PSA regime. The special 
participation would be much easier to be changed as it would not require 
the approval from its national congress. So, a fiscal adjustment in the 
petroleum legal regime would have allowed for development on the pre-salt 
reserves within a shorter period of time, as well as maintaining the stability 
and progress of the previous petroleum regime. M.R. de Oliveira gives a 
good example of this matter:  
  
                                                                                                             
Parliament to Approve Petroleum Explration Contract Between Ghana and AGM 
Petroleum, ALL AFRICA (Nov. 29, 2013) https://allafrica.com/stories/201312020636.html; 
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(Aug. 24, 2016) https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/08/iran-petroleum-
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Ratifies Agreements on “Umid-Babek” Block, AZ REPORT NEWS AGENCY (May 2, 2017, 
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“(...) PSA offers no additional benefits to Brazil, since a simple 
change in contractual regime will not necessarily increase the 
government take. In addition, comparing both regimes, it was 
proven that it is feasible to arrive at similar government take 
whatever type of contract is in force.”
 221
 
Why was there a need to implement a new petroleum regime to develop 
the well known and prospective Pre-Salt area?
 222
 The most reasonable 
answer stems from political and national security issues. It is possible to 
suggest that the creation of a new NOC in the Brazilian petroleum regime 
has clear political motivation, which is directly related to the rationale 
behind the new PSA.
223
 
Although most developing countries face popular claims to protect 
national resources and feel uncomfortable delegating proprietary rights to 
an IOC, this, in theory, should not apply to the currently Brazilian scenario 
as the state monopoly was relaxed in 1995 and it was working fairly well 
for over ten years. However, sustained political stability is hard to achieve 
in any country and these recent changes within the Brazilian Upstream 
sector seem to be a regressive measure towards national restriction from 
private and foreign investment. Nevertheless, it is important to highlight 
that some of the restrictions of the PSA regime (e.g. operatorship) have 
been made more flexible due to the financial crises and scandals suffered by 
Petrobras.
224
 
8.1.2. Practical Example: Malaysian Concession Agreement 
Malaysia is a constitutional monarchy with an elected Parliament. It was 
a British protectorate and it achieved independence in 1957. Since 
independence, Malaysia has had one of the best economic records in Asia, 
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with Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growing at an average 6.5% per 
annum for almost 50 years.
225
 Natural resources are one of the major 
contributors to the growth of the Malaysian economy.
226
  
In general, people might get mislead with the history of petroleum 
industry in Malaysia. It might be perceived that the productions of oil and 
gas were only started when PETRONAS was founded in 1974.
227
 However, 
such perception is incorrect. The petroleum industry had in fact begun long 
time ago during the British colonial period. The British colonial masters 
had exploited hydrocarbons and other minerals in the country including tins 
prior to the independence of Malaya in 1957.
228
 Petroleum exploration in 
Malaysia commenced in the beginning of the 20
th
 century in Sarawak, 
where oil was first discovered in 1909 and first produced in 1910.
229
 The oil 
companies in Malaysia had been previously operating under a concession 
system.  
Post-independence, Malaysia inherited and continued using the same 
concession system. In fact, more concessions were awarded to Shell and 
Esso to explore oil and gas in the deep-water of Malaysia.
230
 Under this 
system, the IOCs were given extensive rights over a certain area, including 
potential reserves contained in the oilfield.
231
 On this point, the entire area 
of development expenses would be borne by the IOCs in which they had 
significant freedom of contract and procurement rights, technology 
decisions, while local host government had almost limited right to make 
decision except for several matters pertaining to environmental and safety 
regulations.
232
 In exchange for these rights, the IOC was obliged to pay the 
government the royalties and taxes. 
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Original Areas Awarded to IOCs Under Concession System
233
 
Location Company Area 
(square 
kilometers) 
Onshore/ Offshore 
Peninsular 
Malaysia  
 
Mobil Malaysia 
Exploration Company 
Esso Production 
Malaysia Incorporated 
Continental Oil 
Company 
31,997 
 
72,520 
 
52,839 
Offshore 
 
Offshore 
 
Offshore 
Sabah  
 
 
Sabah Shell Petroleum 
Company 
Aquitane Petroleum 
Company (S. E. A.) 
Esso Production 
Malaysia Incorporated 
Sabah Teiseki Oil 
Company Sdn. Bhd. 
Oceanic Exploration And 
Development 
Corporation 
26,374 
 
6,838 
 
19,891 
 
6,630 
 
1,469 
Offshore and Onshore 
 
Offshore and Onshore 
 
Offshore and Onshore 
 
Offshore and Onshore 
 
Onshore 
 
Sarawak Sarawak Shell Berhad 177,720 Offshore and Onshore 
 
A conventional concession-type relationship of IOC with the host-
government was governed by the Petroleum Mining Act 1966 and the 
Petroleum Income Tax Act 1967.  IOCs were operating under the system of 
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concession were given significant freedom in the management of petroleum 
resources and control the ownership of all assets, and crude oil and gas 
produced. In return they paid royalty to the HG amounting to between 8 to 
11 percent of output produced and sold after 5 years of production and 
corporate income taxes at the rate of 50 percent to the Federal Government. 
Posted price was used as the base for income tax payments.  
It is important to note that after the 1973 oil embargo, the oil-producing 
countries of the world realized the importance of monitoring their own 
petroleum resources.
234
 In Malaysia, it led to the legislation of the 
Petroleum Development Act (PDA) in 1974 and the formation of a national 
oil company to ensure that the nation’s petroleum resources could be 
developed in line with the desires and wishes of the nation. This 
corporation was known as the ‘Perbadanan Petroliam Nasional’ (National 
Petroleum Corporation) or PETRONAS.
235
 Subsequent to the legislation, 
Malaysia switched over from the concession system to the PSC model. 
8.1.3. Practical Example: Libyan Concession  
The classic concession model was the initial arrangement between the 
Libyan government and the IOCs for petroleum exploration and production, 
and the granting of concessions began soon after approval of the Petroleum 
Law in 1955. In terms of ownership of oil and gas, the Law stated in Article 
(1) that hydrocarbons found in their natural state in the subsoil layers of 
Libya are regarded as state-owned property. The primary objective of the 
Libyan Petroleum Law of 1955 had been to attract and encourage IOCs to 
invest in Libya, diverting their historical interest away from the Middle 
East.
 
 
Concessionaires were granted rights that covered vast areas, and the 
duration of the concession was considerable, typically fifty years, and some 
of them are still in operation (e.g., Wintershall). The country was divided 
into four zones.
236
 With regard to relinquishment, concessions had to be 
reduced to 75% of their original size within five years, 50% within eight 
years, and to 33⅓% within 10 years for areas located in the Zones I and II, 
                                                                                                             
 234. Hamdan and others (n 29).  
 235. Khalid Abdul Rahim and Audrey Liwan, ‘Oil and Gas Trends and Implications in 
Malaysia’ [2012] Energy Pol’y. 262.  
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and 25% for areas located in Zones III and IV. The concessionaires were 
given exemption from export and import duties and total control of 
petroleum exploitation, with freedom to explore for oil under the most 
flexible terms. In the case of discovery of commercial quantities of oil, they 
had the right to produce and export any amount of crude oil at their own 
quoted prices. The government had no claim on the proceeds of oil 
revenues apart from the right to receive specified royalty and taxes. No 
revision of the concessions terms could be effected without prior 
consultation of the companies. In actual fact, in retrospect, the law was 
clearly drafted in line with the requirements of the oil companies, to ensure 
total control and take full responsibility in running the petroleum activities 
and operations. Fiscally, they can be described as a tax-royalty system, 
within which, effectively, the role of the Libyan government was restricted 
to that of a “royalty and tax collector”. 
The royalty and tax rates had been maintained at the original level 
provided for in the concessionary principle of 12½ and 50 percent 
respectively. The posted prices remained low at the same level as during the 
concessions period
237
. It is clear that during the time when the original 
concessions were granted the Government, due to lack of experience, was 
reasonably satisfied with the conditions and share of the revenue provided 
by the major companies. Moreover, at the time the Government was 
influenced by the dominant political stance of the oil companies’ home 
governments. This situation effectively put the government in a feeble 
bargaining position, which the major companies exploited. The dominant 
position of the major companies ensured that they maintained this situation 
and prevented any improvements in the posted price, royalty and income 
taxes throughout the sixties. However, these circumstances were radically 
changed through the nationalization policy of the new government in the 
early 1970s. 
In its approach to the restructuring of the Libyan oil industry in 1970, the 
new government was keen to secure two important objectives. Firstly, 
operational control, ranging from exploration, field development and 
production levels, had to be wrested from the IOCs and placed firmly in the 
hands of the Libyan government. Secondly, a fair price reflecting the 
intrinsic quality of Libyan crude and its geographical advantages over Gulf 
crude had to be secured in international markets, and the government’s 
share of revenue generated from this had to be significantly increased. 
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Turning to perceptions of participation at senior levels in the Libyan 
Government, at the time there were three fundamental issues between the 
Government and the oil companies:1)the government’s desire for a fair 
posted price for its crude, 2) a wish to reduce production levels, and 3) the 
nationalization process. Regardless of the OPEC Resolution relating to 
participation agreements, Libyan thinking had gone far beyond the two 
basic terms advocated by OPEC for its members - host government 
participation to begin at 25 percent and to increase gradually to 51 percent, 
and compensation at updated book values.  
After its success in its participation and nationalisation initiatives, the 
Libyan government went further towards increasing revenue from its 
upstream oil sector. It rapidly followed OPEC in increasing its share of 
revenue from royalties and taxes in line with OPEC’s Geneva and Ecuador 
meetings in 1974. In fact in the period from 1971–1974 the Libyan 
government made several fiscal terms changes to the Petroleum Law, which 
increased royalty from 12½% to 14½% and then to 16.67%, with taxes also 
gradually increased from their level in the original concession 50%, to 55%, 
then to 60% and finally to 65%. In addition, after long and acrimonious 
negotiations with the IOCs to increase the posted price, the government 
achieved this through the 1 September 1970 settlement, the Caracas Posted 
Prices Agreement in December 1970, the Tehran Agreement of 14 February 
1971 and the Tripoli Agreement of 20 March 1971. As a result, the Libyan 
posted price was increased from $2.23 a barrel in 1970 to $3.386 a barrel by 
1973. Through this amendment, the government’s share in the profits 
realised by the concessionaires was boosted considerably. Given the fact 
that the government held the majority in its partnerships with the oil 
companies, it can be said that the government controlled high portion of oil 
proceeds. 
In any case, the classical concessions were in many ways less favourable 
to government than were those obtained by other producing countries in 
terms of the economic and financial benefits. However, the raison d’être of 
these terms was their attractiveness to the IOCs. This turned out to be one 
of the key features that contributed to rapid growth of the Libyan upstream 
sector during the period from mid of 1950s to early 1970s.  
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8.2. Production Sharing Contracts (PSC’s) 
The idea of the state and companies creating an enterprise to share the 
production of hydrocarbon resources was first developed in Bolivia in the 
1950s, but only took a firm hold when the Production Sharing Contract 
(PSC) was introduced in Indonesia in 1966.
238
  Here, the extraction of 
petroleum is no longer limited primarily to a royalty and tax licence, with 
the IOC receiving a mining title or license to extract oil, for the simple 
reason that the IOC is not in fact the owner of the production. Although 
different types of PSCs evolved in different countries in the years that 
followed, these new arrangements shared common fundamentals. Among 
the main ones are the cost recovery aspect, referred to as cost oil, the profit 
split features, and in some cases taxation While fiscal elements, such as 
taxes, were usually the subject of national legislation, others were subject to 
negotiation as stated in individual agreements.
239
 
The first model of this kind in Indonesia was that between the US 
consortium known as IIAPCO and the Indonesian National Oil Company 
Pertamina, and was devised by Dr. Ibnu Sutowo, the President –Director of 
Pertamina. Following this model there was no royalty and taxation imposed 
on the second party, because Pertamina owned all production inclusive of 
crude stored at export terminals. IIAPCO was allowed to recover annually 
approximately 40 percent of its exploration and operations costs. The 60 
percent left was designated as profit oil to be split 65: 35 percent in favour 
of Pertamina. Further, when crude oil production exceeded 75,000 b/d, 
Pertamina received 67.5 percent and IIAPCO the remaining 32.5 percent. 
Furthermore, as generally applied to all subsequent Indonesian PSCs, the 
IOCs had to sell 25 percent of its profit oil to the Pertamina under a 
domestic market obligation, usually at 15 percent of market price. This 
raised the State’s take yearly production from about 39 percent to 
approximately 46 percent
240
. 
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In the succeeding decades, the PSC evolved successfully in line with the 
huge transformations and consolidations which took place in the global oil 
industry. The “Indonesian Formula” as it became known in petroleum 
circles proved highly successful in satisfying the aspirations of the host 
governments, providing them with control over all phases in the oil 
industry, from exploration through production to marketing. At the same 
time these PSCs provided a legal and commercial framework within which 
the HGs felt as secure as IOCs to certain extent.
241
 
PSCs are now used extensively in agreements for oil and gas E&P, 
particularly in developing countries, even though a number of them might 
be considered as hybrid HGIs.
242
 The terms of the PSC determine 
ownership and allocation of production, usually expressed as a percentage 
which is calculated on the level of production, with each party free to 
monetise or commercialise its respective share subject to the agreed terms 
and conditions after deducting the costs which are known as profit oil.
243
 
Under the PSC system, the investor will usually only receive a share of the 
oil or gas produced rather than the entire production.
 244
  
However, the HG neither reimburses, nor compensates the relevant 
contractor if there isno commercial discovery.
245
 On the other hand, if 
exploration is a success, and oil or gas can be produced commercially, 
production will be shared between the contractor and the state according to 
the formula(s) agreed on in the contract.
246
 Unlike the concession 
agreement, the government receives a specific share of oil or gas after the 
deduction of the permitted costs has been taken by the investor, known as 
cost oil or cost recovery.
247
  
Countries utilizing PSCs include but are not limited to Nigeria, 
Equatorial Guinea, Angola, Brazil, Mexico, Russia, Cyprus, Sudan, Egypt, 
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Malaysia, Indonesia, India, Bangladesh, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and 
Uzbekistan. 
8.2.1. Practical Example: Recent Indonesian PSC Changes  
As previously mentioned, the Indonesian government, through its 
Regulation No 8 of 2017, required that for all new PSCs, a “gross split” 
mechanism will determine the allocation of production from petroleum 
operations between the HG and the IOC. This new system will increase the 
investors’ share of the gross production in exchange for the removal of the 
existing, traditional cost recovery mechanism outlined earlier. The main 
rational behind such decision was due to lower oil price combined with 
higher cost recovery payments.  
Under a “gross split” PSC, gross production will be allocated between 
the HG and the IOC based solely on production splits, without involving an 
operational cost recovery mechanism.  On this basis, the Investor’s 
entitlement to production for each lifting period, and the resulting revenues, 
will be determined solely on its gross split percentage, which is determined 
on a pre-tax basis.  
Clearly the absence of cost recovery in gross split PSCs will mean that 
the State’s entitlement to oil and gas in the early years of production under 
a gross split PSC will be higher. As a result, Investor may need to wait 
longer to recover their investment costs under gross split PSCs. This 
changes the dynamics of a contractor’s investment and potentially increases 
their investment and funding risk. Investors will likely place increased 
emphasis on reserves and production forecasts when making their 
investment decisions and may seek to mitigate their cost exposure where 
there is more uncertainty in terms of investment recovery (e.g. when 
agreeing firm work commitments)
248
. Nevertheless, the cost recovery 
system was not completely removed as some depreciation and/or tax 
deductions might be allowed in the new system.  
In any case, the new system adopted in Indonesia encourages higher 
performance of local content and other parameters in order to allocate 
higher profit share to the investors.  
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However, it remains to be seen if other countries will follow the lead of 
Indonesia once again, as  these proposed changes could eliminate the 
inefficiency or potential corruption in PSC systems.  
8.2.3. Practical Example: Malaysian PSC 
In the early 1970’s, several countries have moved from traditional 
concession approach to the PSC.
249
 In the formative phase of PETRONAS, 
there was a close relationship between the heads of PETRONAS and 
PERTAMINA i.e. the Indonesian national oil company, whereby 
PERTAMINA offered technical assistance and legal advice to Malaysian 
counterparts.
250
 In the mid-1970s, Malaysia switched over from the 
concession system to the PSC model.
251
 It provided incentives for IOCs to 
continue to produce oil and invest in exploration while at the same time 
prevent high rental level of capture by foreign oil companies. ‘Under a 
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legislation enacted in 1985, PETRONAS is required to hold a 15 per cent 
minimum equity in PSC’s with all foreign and private companies.’
252
 
‘PETRONAS as a regulator awarded PSC to a number of international 
O&G companies, including to its wholly owned exploration and production 
(“E&P”) subsidiary, PETRONAS Carigali Sdn Bhd (PCSB)’.
253
 In this 
regard, IOCs that intended to carry out exploitation of hydrocarbon in 
Malaysia had to enter into a PSC or another form of E&P arrangement with 
PETRONAS.
254
 Under the PSCs, all risks and financing hadto be borne and 
provided by the Investors in exchange for an agreed portion of the total 
production, including recovery costs through the expenses of oil or gas 
costs.
 255
 The Investors were required to observe the minimum level of 
commitment for the operations especially in relation to work and finance.
256
 
In addition, the Investors were also required to seek various approvals from 
PETRONAS throughout all phases of operations.
257
 Failure to comply with 
these requirements resulted in automatic relinquishment of the rights to 
carry out the upstream activities with PETRONAS.
258
  
To date, PETRONAS has entered into 101 PSCs.
259
 The first was signed 
with Shell in 1976 with revisions made in 1985.
260
 Later, two sets of deep-
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sea PSCs were introduced in 1993 and onshore PSC terms were developed 
in 1995.
261
 Recently, PETRONAS has taken initiative by introducing 
Enhanced Oil Recovery (“EOR”) PSC Terms in order to attract and reward 
IOCs to deploy the EOR techniques. 
262
   
8.2.4. Practical Example: Libyan EPSAs 
In case of Libya, the rise in prices during 1973–1974 led to massive 
profits for the oil companies under the classic concession terms and 
participation agreements. This turned out to be one of the major factors 
driving the emergence of the first Libyan PSC (Exploration and Production 
Sharing Agreement, EPSA-I) in 1974, followed by EPSA-II in 1980, the 
latter introduced during the second oil market shock following the Iranian 
Revolution in 1979.  
Two main factors lead to the Libyan government’s introduction of the 
EPSA-I. Firstly, the Libyan petroleum authorities, after the completion of 
the nationalization or participation process of its oil industry in the first half 
of the seventies, felt reasonably confident about their ability to exercise 
control over all stages of the oil production cycle, from exploration to 
selling. The creation of the Libyan National Oil Corporation (LNOC)
263
 
was  presented with a very challenging agenda by the Libyan Government. 
–It hadto harness the potential oil and gas wealth of the  unexplored and 
undeveloped areas of the country, and  toacquire foreign capital and 
technological expertise to do so. Secondly, global oil prices increased by 
approximately 400% in less than half a year, during 1973-1974. In these 
circumstances, the oil companies were seen to be making excessive profits 
under the classical concession-type agreements. 
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It is useful to consider how the Libyan EPSA I model differed from 
similar type of agreements used in other producing countries at the time
264
. 
The Libyan first model of PSC did not set aside any part of the production 
for cost recovery. Instead, the investor received a fixed percentage of 
production. This percentage was different for offshore and onshore acreage 
with the majority of agreements concluded based on the 85:15 percent 
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formula for onshore and 81:19 percent for offshore areas in favour to 
LNOC
265
. 
Essentially the EPSA-II terms were not significantly different from those 
offered in the first generation EPSA’s in 1974 EPSA-II terms were 
generally regarded by foreign investors as too heavily weighted in favor of 
LNOC, and were seen as less favorable to them than EPSA-I. Production 
sharing under EPSA-II was different depending on the prospects of the 
acreage concerned. These were 85:15 percent to LNOC’s advantage for 
what was classified as top acreage, 81:19 percent for medium acreage, and 
75:25 percent for the least favored acreage, but again the IOC’s share of 
output was free of taxes and royalties. 
A drop in oil prices during the 1980s had devastating effects on the 
Libyan economy as well as on oil companies globally. In 1983 the oil price 
was $34 a barrel while in 1986 it was less than $10. The decline in oil 
prices adversely affected the capacity of the oil companies
` 
to invest in 
petroleum exploration and development in Libya.  
These market conditions and the impact of the US companies’ 
withdrawal from the Libyan oil sector in 1986, exacerbated the LNOC’s 
multiple problems which, because of insufficient  E&P brought about by 
the strict terms of EPSA-I and II, forced a change. To reverse the situation, 
the third one (EPSA-III) was announced by the Libyan government in 1988 
as a response to changes in the international oil market and an attempt to 
attract more participants in new exploration. In this new model the LNOC 
adopted flexible contractual terms, including the guaranteeing of cost 
recovery by the international oil companies, and the achievement of a larger 
and earlier cash flow on investments relative to the previous generation of 
agreements. Despite the new attractive terms, however, the Libyan oil 
sector was still overwhelmed by a continuing drop in oil prices, and the 
political fallout from the sanctions imposed by the US and United Nations. 
The lifting of US sanctions against Libya in 2004, and drastic changes in 
the geopolitics of the global energy markets in the preceding 30 years made 
it imperative for the LNOC to re-evaluate its relationship with the 
international oil companies. In the 1970s and the early 1980s, the 
competitive environment in the industry was characterised by limited 
opportunities and abundant financial resources, largely because significant 
parts of the world were closed to direct foreign investment and because of 
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the prevalence of high oil prices respectively. In the early 1990s, as most 
countries started to open up, new opportunities became available to the 
IOCs at a time when the available financial resources were scarce, mainly 
due to relatively lower oil prices.  
Therefore, the Libyan government reacted swiftly and took a major step 
in supporting the IOC’s confidence in Libya by introducing its fourth 
generation production sharing contract model, or EPSA IV. 
The four generations of EPSA vary considerably in their economic, 
financial, and legal terms and implications
266
, but while there was 
considerable continuity and similarity between EPSA-I and II, EPSA-III 
was radically different and similar to EPSA-IV.Currently EPSA-IV is the 
only contractual form presented by the Libyan government to IOCs wishing 
to invest in the Libyan  E&P sector.  
EPSA-IV was designed and modified to replace all the previous models. 
In addition, complete transparency was brought into the bidding process, as 
further incentive for IOCs to invest in the Libya  
The new terms of EPSA-IV provide for exploration, appraisal, 
development and production costs to be recovered very quickly from a 
proportion of output, for development costs to be equally shared between 
the investor and LNOC, and for profit production share to be split on a 
sliding scale. The new EPSA-IV also covered all sizes of discoveries. Small 
discoveries could still secure an acceptable return to the IOC as well as 
giving it a fair return in the case of major or giant discoveries. Management 
Committee rules are similar to EPSA-III, with the only changes made as to 
their composition, now four members, two each from LNOC and the 
Second Party. Additionally no income taxes, royalties, rents or fees are 
levied on the Second Party’s share of production.    
The IOCs will totally finance and take the risk of exploration and 
appraisal, as well providing training expenses for nationals during the 
exploration period. In the event of commercial discovery the development 
expenditures and risks are shared fifty-fifty with LNOC. The operation 
costs are divided according to the parties’ respective shares of total 
production (which vary over lifetime of the field). The system is thus a 
production sharing agreement plus contributory state participation. The 
investor’s liability for royalties, income tax (including surtax), and other 
direct taxes is met by LNOC on his behalf, however excluding the new 
bonuses charges which will be paid by the oil company.  
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Furthermore, the IOCs are in principle subject to customs duties, but in 
accordance with the Petroleum Law they are exempt from duties on the 
importation of plant, tools, machinery, equipment and materials used for 
petroleum operations.  It is stipulated under the EPSA rules that whatever is 
exempt becomes the property of LNOC immediately after purchase, 
whether purchased in Libya, or when landed at a Libyan port if purchased 
outside Libya. LNOC also has title to all original data resulting from 
operations under EPSA IV.       
In this regard, however, although the EPSA-IV terms appear to be very 
flexible to IOCs,  further consideration needs to be given to several issues. 
Firstly, the LNOC first take should be reconsidered, allowing cost recovery 
to be maintained at a reasonable level, so that the IOCs can recover their 
development and production outlays sooner. Secondly, in the negotiations 
for the setting of the A and B factor both LNOC and the IOCs should 
carefully consider unknown factors such as fluctuations in the oil price and 
unanticipated field conditions involving cost escalations, in order that 
potential risks can be contained. Finally, the LNOC also takes into account 
the geographical location and infrastructural challenges of the high risk 
basins. 
The approach Libya took with its EPSA-4 licensing was consistent with 
much of the disclosure and transparency initiatives underway worldwide. 
Unfortunately, the sealed-bid type of license round with full disclosure does 
not work so well for countries with modest or questionable geological 
potential. As a result and as a matter of necessity, non-transparent, 
negotiated deals will continue to be part of the industry’s future.
267
 
8.3. Service Contracts   
Service Contracts, also referred to as advisory agreements, technical 
assistance agreements, or operational agreements represent a commercial 
arrangement whereby the HG or the NOC grants certain contractual, but 
not proprietary rights to an IOC for the extraction of oil and gas. Service 
contracts can be divided into two possible sub-categories: RSC and Pure 
Service Contracts. The RSC entitles the contractor to carry out E&P 
activities at its own risk and expense, while the HG reserves the right to 
exclusive ownership of any hydrocarbon reserves resulting from the 
exploration. In exceptional cases, the contractor might receive a fee in kind 
in the form of entitlement to a share of oil/gas, or the right to purchase the 
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production from the HG, sometimes at a preferential  price; where there is 
no commercial production from the exploration, the agreement is 
terminated with no legal obligations for any party. 
In the terms of a Pure Service Contract, the HG takes on all the risks 
associated with the investment and engages a contractor, usually for an 
agreed flat rate, to carry out the E&P activities. In this case, the contractor 
takes on the role of service provider and has no interests in nor will derive 
any benefits from the investment. 
The common perception of an IOC is that the contractor is the least 
incentivized whenever the HG increases its ownership and control of its 
reserves. This is the case for a contractual framework which does not allow 
IOCs to retain and/or “book” reserves. Nonetheless, oil and gas service 
providers like Halliburton or Schlumberger might fit perfectly well into this 
“profile” and eventually the HG could offer higher flat fees or sliding scale 
fees, which could encourage IOCs as well.  
Service contracts might be common in certain regions or associated with 
countries that have suffered previous political unrest or where the 
constitution prohibits private companies from retaining ownership of oil 
and gas resources  (for example, in Iran). Mexico used to be another  
example of these constitutional restrictions although the Energy Reform 
Decree of 2013 has gone some way to allowing it to move away from such 
restrictions
268
.   
8.3.1. Practical Example: Malaysian RSC 
Malaysia faces the risk of shortage of natural hydrocarbon resources in 
the coming years. Given the continued exploration of more petroleum, 
resulting from the increased demand for domestic consumption, Malaysia 
cannot ignore and neglect the need to develop existing marginal fields.   
Malaysia has identified more than 100 marginal fields, but most of them 
have not yet been fully developed. It is important to note that the cost 
required to build a small field is somewhat similar to what is needed for a 
large field. Therefore, PETRONAS recently proposed an alternative to 
attract IOCs to invest in its business, namely the risk service contract 
(RSC). ‘Beginning 2011, PETRONAS has adopted the [RSCs] approach as 
an alternative to the PSC regime in developing marginal fields. Marginal 
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fields are those with reserves of less than 30 million barrels of recoverable 
oil or oil equivalent.’
269
  
 The Contractors are responsible for all exploration expenses including 
field development and operation, and undertake to absorb related risks and 
these expenses are usually being monitored and approved by PETRONAS 
throughout the operation.
 270
 However, ‘[u]nlike the PSC regime, no 
research or abandonment commitment is imposed on the contractor.’
271
  
The Contractors are compensated for any commercial discovery, which 
is based upon performance against negotiable performance indicators.
272
 
The ownership and the control of the reserves, however, remain with 
PETRONAS.
 273
 Under RSC, petroleum taxes would not be imposed to 
remuneration fees, however, the tax still applies to companies in Malaysia. 
According to Wood Mackenzie,
274
 the basic fiscal terms for this new 
Malaysian RSC are:  
$ Contractor can recover capital and operating costs from annual 
revenues, up to a 70% ceiling (capital cost recovery is limited to 
120% of the capital cost estimate bid by the contractor).  
$ Contractor will then receive a remuneration fee, based on a 
negotiable fixed fee per barrel linked to production performance 
and capital cost performance multipliers.  
$ Any unrecovered costs at end of field life or contract expiry will 
be reimbursed  
$ Royalty of 10% to be paid by PETRONAS.  
$ Contractor is not liable for abandonment or research 
payments.
275
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The first RSC was awarded in 2011 to Kencana Petroleum Bhd, Sapura 
Crest Petroleum Bhd, and Petrofac Energy Developments Sdn Bhd for the 
development of the Berantai field, situated offshore Terengganu, 
Malaysia.
276
 Later, the second RSC was awarded to Dialog Group Bhd, Roc 
Oil Malaysia (Holdings) Sdn Bhd and PETRONAS Carigali Sdn Bhd for 
Balai Cluster Fields, offshore Sarawak, and the most recent RSC was 
awarded to Coastal Energy Co for the Kapal, Banang and Meranti fields.
277
 
8.3.2. Practical Example: The Iranian Buy Back Contracts 
The Iranian Constitution of 1979 prohibited the granting of petroleum 
rights on a concessionary basis or holdings of direct equity stakes in 
petroleum ventures to foreign companies or individuals. Later on the Oil 
Act of 1987 permitted the establishment of contracts between the Iranian 
Ministry of Petroleum and the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), and 
local or foreign investors. Such contracts were defined in Article 1 as 
“contractual obligations (undertakings) concluded between the Ministry of 
Oil or an operational unit or any natural person or legal entity for carrying 
out and fulfilling a part of the petroleum operations in conformity with the 
laws and regulations of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran and 
on the basis of the provisions of this Act”. This gave rise to the Iranian Buy 
Back Contract. 
Within the legal framework developed above a compromise was reached 
to develop the Iranian oil and gas industry despite the constraints imposed 
by the 1979 Constitution. This was accomplished by the legal device of the 
“buy back contract” as a “form of financing” rather than “foreign direct 
investment.” 
Under these contracts, the IOC investment is converted to a project loan 
(annuity), which is paid back by the revenue generated from a percentage of 
the oil produced, derived from a long-term export oil sales agreement 
(LTEOSA). In operational terms, the Iranian buy-back can be defined as a 
service contract undertaken to achieve specific developmental goals, and 
can be summarized as follows: 
$ The IOC, acting essentially as a contractor, provides all the 
capital required to finance a specific development or 
rehabilitation project. 
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$ The contractor is reimbursed for capital expenditure and 
associated financing costs plus an agreed profit over a specified 
period, usually 3-6 years from the date of the first production, 
from up to 60-65% of the field’s output. Accordingly, the 
National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) takes all the risks 
associated with oil price fluctuations. 
$ The profit or rate of return on the IOC’s investment varies from 
project to project, and is normally between 15% and 20%. 
$ The Contractor’s profits are paid in equal installments over an 
agreed amortization period. 
$ NIOC takes over the operation of the field upon the 
commencement of production and is responsible for the 
operating costs. 
$ The Contractor holds no equity in the field. Over the years since 
their inception in 1995, the Iranian buyback contracts have 
evolved into three types, the Exploration Service Contract, the 
Development Service Contract and the Exploration & 
Development Service Contract.
278
 
The Iranian government recently changed its contractual regime, offering 
more attractive terms for foreign investors under an Iranian Petroleum 
Contract. These new terms could be summarized as follows: 
$ A longer term (up to a maximum of 20 years from the start of 
development operations, with the opportunity to extend further 
in the case of IOR/EOR projects); 
$ Ability of the foreign investor to be involved in operating the 
fields during production; 
$ A remuneration fee set as a $/bl or $/scf amount, established in 
order to incentivize production efficiency, and linked to 
the market prices for oil and condensate and also to the regional 
or contractual prices of gas; 
$ Incentives for higher risk fields, as well as IOR/EOR projects; 
and 
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$ Requirements and incentives for the transfer of technology and 
know-how, as well as participation of Iranian entities in all 
phases of the project.
279
 
However, the full details of these new terms are not yet disclosed to the 
public as only a few IPC have been signed and they are confidential.  
8.4 Joint Ventures  
In some jurisdictions a joint venture (JV) with a government entity is 
required to develop resources as previously mentioned.  This strikes a 
balance between a NOC wholly developing petroleum assets, which for 
obvious reasons can be problematic, and the HG tendering blocks of land to 
an IOC, which, for political and historical reasons, may not be possible.  
Instead, the JV is a sort of strategic alliance between an IOC and NOC to 
produce assets with some level of involvement by both parties. 
280
 
The basic structure of an equity JV is that the host government and IOCs 
will agree to form a “partnership” should commercial quantities of crude be 
discovered, with the foreign partner financing the exploration phase. If a 
commercial discovery is made an operating company is normally 
established, with each owning fifty percent of the shares. In general terms 
the profit split should ensure that the HG obtains up to approximately 75 
percent of the net profit. It should be observed that this profit will be 
calculated on basis of the achieved prices and not the declared or posted 
prices as in the classical concession contracts. This went a long way to 
correct the abuses inherent in the concession system in which discounts, 
allowances and under-invoicing were used by the IOC’s to slim down state 
share. However, the real distinctive aspect in these agreements was the 
positive participation of the national governments in controlling their 
natural sources, the gaining of experience in the actual running of 
petroleum operations, and role of the national governments in making 
critical decisions with regard to the petroleum industry.  
8.4.1. Practical Example: MENA Joint Venture Agreements 
In the petroleum industry JVs were introduced for the first time in the 
Middle East in March 1957, when Iran signed the first such deal with ENI 
of Italy (which came to be known as the “Mattei Formula” – marked the 
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beginning of a turning point in relations between producer countries and the 
world’s oil companies). The Iranian model was quickly adopted by Kuwait, 
Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi and Libya in 1961, 1965, 1967 and 1968, 
respectively.  
However, Libyan JVs never succeed since the E&P industry was 
dominated and controlled by the concessionaires, where the later would not 
allow such transformation that would affect their interests in Libya and 
other oil producing countries. By the end sixties a new approach of fiscal 
regime was emerged among the OPEC oil producing countries. This was 
called the “Participation Agreement”.  
One of the key factors leading to the emergence of host government 
participation was OPEC’s role in promoting guidelines for more 
appropriate and just concession agreements among its members, since 
throughout early 1970s, the efforts of OPEC had been concentrated on two 
main issues. Firstly, the attainment of a reasonable price for its crude in an 
international situation suffering from acute financial dislocation. Secondly, 
OPEC was pushing all its member countries to negotiate their participation 
in production with IOCs. The outcome of this was OPEC’s Resolution 
No.139 of 22
nd
 September 1971, the “General Agreement on Participation” 
calling for its members to acquire a “sensible” level of participation in oil 
operations in their respective countries.  
Originally the idea of participation emerged as an indirect consequence 
of the views of Sheikh Tariki, the Saudi Arabian Oil Minister. Tariki, 
known for his fiery speeches regarding national rights and nationalization 
policies against the majors in meetings of the Arab Petroleum Congress and 
in OPEC itself, had unambiguously declared that
281
 “once we are strong 
enough to shut down all the wells, and shut off the pipelines, the companies 
will see great light. The world cannot live without Middle East oil
282
.”  
In this regard, the Libyan government was also influenced by OPEC 
guidelines in respect of participation agreements, highlighted in 
abovementioned resolution, which called for its members to acquire a 
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‘sensible’ level of participation in oil operations, based on two basic criteria 
advocated by OPEC – the host government participation should begin at 
25% and to increase gradually to 51%; and compensation for nationalised 
assets was to be given at updated book values.
283
  
Another example is Qatar. Qatar has been trending away from PSC to 
JVs. The North Oil Company is a joint venture with the NOC, Qatar 
Petroleum, and Total developing and producing on of the largest and most 
complex oil fields in the world, the Al-Shaheen Field.
284
 Other exceptional 
examples may include Eni and PetroChina entering into a memorandum of 
understanding to develop unconventional resources in China
285
 and Abu 
Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) entering into an agreement with 
Occidental Petroleum to develop reservoirs in the Shah field southwest of 
Abu Dhabi.
286
 
In any case, it is relevant to point out that a number of these joint 
ventures were conducted several decades ago. Nevertheless, they might still 
exist in very limited exceptions in the Asia/Middle East (i.e. in Qatar).   
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